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ABSTRACT 
 
For almost sixty years, the European Union (EU) and its member states have cultivated the 
process of integration.  At the geographical “front lines” of this process, local and regional actors 
form State-sanctioned, supranationally-enabled cross-border regions (CBRs) while carrying out 
various pragmatic cross-border cooperation (CBC) projects to address shared objectives in the 
midst of disparate societies, economies and governance structures.  This research project 
investigates the objectives of three such initiatives at the border of Spain and Portugal, the 
unique but overlooked “Eurocity” projects, whose lead actors make bold claims of representing 
the “second generation” of CBC, constructing “eurocitizens” in pursuit of the “New Europe”.  A 
content analysis of project objectives within press, websites and official project documentation 
suggests that local and regional Eurocity actors pursue varied objectives related to the economy, 
governance and society primarily as a means of improving the implicated border economies.  
Objectives related to enhancing localized policymaking authority or re-uniting a “submerged” 
people appear to play only a secondary role at best, commenting on the multi-level governance 
(MLG), intergovernmentalism and “Europe of the Regions” paradigms.  Findings address current 
geographic and scalar gaps in “border studies” scholarship and raise significant questions 
surrounding the effects of such cooperation and its future vis-à-vis the current European financial 
and sovereign debt crises.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Up to the end of the 18
th
 century borders defining political entities were permeable and highly 
variable; a mesh of borders, such as internal customs borders, tax borders, town borders, etc., 
was spread across the land. It was only at the end of the 18
th
 century and the beginning of the 
19
th
, as the  concept  of  the  ‘nation  state’  began  to  assert  itself  in Europe,  that national 
borders became  single,  sealed,  and  efficient  lines,  like  a moat between clearly separate 
nationalities. 
-Brigitta Busch (2003: 127) 
    
1.1 European integration and cross-border cooperation 
 
For almost sixty years, the European Union (EU) and its member states have cultivated 
the process of integration, working to break through the “single, sealed, and efficient lines” 
drawn by nation-states over the last two centuries.  Supranational entities such as the European 
Commission, Committee of the Regions and Directorate General (DG) of Regional Policy have 
labored extensively to erase institutional disparities between nations and the regions within them.  
The mandatory acquis communautaire homogenizes jurisdiction of all acceding EU candidate 
states, who are asked to exchange many national rights and obligations for supranational.  
Socially, the Schengen Agreement guarantees participating states’ citizens free movement within 
the EU’s borders, moving people, languages and cultures from one corner of Europe to the other.  
The EU’s economic integration is extensive, boasting an Economic and Monetary Union with a 
single currency shared between seventeen states, and a Single Market promising twenty-seven 
countries and their 480 million people the free movement of people, goods, services and capital 
within the supranational boundaries (Commission 2012f).  The EU’s Cohesion Policy, born in 
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the 1985 Single European Act, has grown in budget and scope, working to make sure that all EU 
citizens can share in the benefits of this Single Market, regardless of their economic or social 
situation (Goulet, ed. 2008: 2).  From the Treaty of Paris to the Treaty of Lisbon, it is clear that 
institutional, social and economic integration has pressed forward in Europe.   
 The practical effects of this process have had a significant effect on the frontiers of EU 
member states.  At the geographical “front lines” of integration, border residents are taking 
advantage of steadily-lowering barriers, using EU financial and administrative support to 
collaborate across state lines in creative and comprehensive ways.  Indeed, this cross-border 
cooperation (CBC) has accelerated to the extent that “today there are virtually no local or 
regional authorities in border areas that are not somehow involved in [CBC] initiatives”, and  
“[v]irtually all European border areas are involved in some type of cross-border region (CBR)” 
(Perkmann 2007: 861; 2003: 153).  This development has not gone by unnoticed by scholars, 
who have coalesced across disciplines to investigate the varied effects of state lines on border 
regions and cross-border integration.   
 
1.2 Gaps in “border studies” literature 
 
However, the current work of “border studies” scholars researching CBC lacks 
comprehensiveness, as essential research agendas and major border regions still require 
examination.  Scholars investigate the problems borders pose to cross-border integration of 
societies, economies and governance structures, yet neglect to ask other fundamental questions in 
the interest of dissecting cooperation.  While lauding the value of the most localized 
perspectives, studies tend to focus on entire CBRs and pass over the individual CBC projects 
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within them, sacrificing depth for breadth.  Geographically, the border region dividing Spain 
from Portugal, one of the longest and historically poorest in the EU, has to date been only twice 
addressed by scholarship.  Regional and local actors presently cooperate extensively both with 
and without supranational funding along the entire length of the border through a multitude of 
projects, none of which has been formally investigated.  Three of these projects, the unique 
“Eurocities”, boast bold agendas, claiming to characterize the “second generation” of CBC, 
constructing “eurocitizens” to form a “New Europe”.  If CBC represents the “front lines” of 
integration, these Hispano-Luso Eurocity initiatives allegedly embody the forward progress of 
those lines, seeking institutional, social and economic integration in an all-inclusive fashion.   
However, they have yet to be addressed in scholarship. 
 
1.3 Research question and hypotheses 
 
Thus, in the interest of addressing present gaps in border studies literature, this research 
project asks, Why do subnational actors at the Hispano-Luso border pursue the Eurocity 
projects; what is the primary objective of the actors leading the projects?  Answering such a 
question attends to both geographic and scalar lacunas in scholarship, researching an overlooked 
region through in-depth data from three projects, rather than an entire CBR, the traditional level 
of investigation.  Moreover, such research adds a needed perspective that scholars have left 
behind, exploring a fundamental factor driving CBC and the border actors that propel CBC 
initiatives on a day-to-day basis.  Finally, investigating the outspoken and comprehensive 
Eurocity projects will not only give a deeper understanding of CBC among these two EU 
member states, but also shed light on theories of European integration.    
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1.4 Outline of the thesis 
 
First, in the “Background” chapter, the supranational efforts of the EU and Council of 
Europe in enabling CBC and CBRs are explored, followed by a summary of current EU-
sponsored collaboration along the Hispano-Luso border, and a brief description of the three 
Eurocity projects.  The subsequent “Literature Review” chapter begins with a summary of two 
competing theories of European integration, followed by an examination of the findings of 
border studies scholarship in regards to institutional and societal barriers faced by CBC actors.  
These conclusions illuminate this research project’s research approach, explained in the 
“Methodology” chapter.  Utilizing data provided by a content analysis of press, websites and 
official documentation surrounding each Eurocity, this section tests three hypotheses to explain 
project objectives.  Evidence suggests that involved local and regional actors pursue objectives 
related to border governance, society and economy mainly as a means of improving the 
implicated border economies.  Agendas related to enhancing local policymaking authority or re-
uniting a “submerged” people appear to play only a secondary role at best.  The various 
implications of these findings are explored in the “Conclusion” chapter.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Definitions of cross-border regions and cross-border cooperation 
 
As of 2003, over 70 cross-border regions (CBRs) had been identified throughout Europe, 
although other sources have measured up to 168 structures (Lepik 2009: 268; Perkmann 2003: 
154).  The definition of CBRs, also known as “euroregions” or “working communities”, varies 
depending on authorship (Lepik 2009: 266).  Some define CBRs from a societal standpoint: they 
are “territorial units spanning two or more state borders, where spatial patterns of social life can 
be organized irrespective of state borders to the benefit of the civil society” (Popescu 2008: 419).  
Elsewhere, CBRs have been defined from a more governmentally-focused stance, as “bounded 
territorial unit[s] composed of the territories of authorities participating in a CBC initiative”, or 
a “territorial unit that comprises contiguous sub-national units from two or more nation states” 
(Perkmann 2003: 157, emphasis his; Perkmann 2006: 254).  Many authors emphasize that 
euroregions are constructed around the “common economic, social or cultural characteristics” of 
border inhabitants, although such “everyday” elements are not universally seen as crucial when 
defining a CBR (Lepik 2009: 268; cf. Perkmann 2003).  The Council of Europe (CoE) has 
described a CBR as “a potential region, inherent in geography, history, ecology, ethnic groups, 
economic possibilities and so on, but disrupted by the sovereignty of the governments ruling on 
each side of the frontier”, basing its definition on the pre-existing qualities of the space (CoE 
1995 cited in Perkmann 2003: 156).  However, this “functional” perspective has been questioned 
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by authors who claim that a CBR is defined by its very “process of construction”, inherent 
commonalities aside (Perkmann 2003: 157, emphasis his).   
Cross-border cooperation (CBC) has been defined as “any concerted action designed to 
reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within 
the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties [e.g., organizations, institutions or businesses 
on either side of the border]” (Council 1980 cited in Lepik 2009: 266).   Elsewhere, Markus 
Perkmann describes CBC as “a more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous 
subnational authorities across national borders” (2003: 156, emphasis his).  He operationalizes 
this “loose definition” by specifying four necessary criteria of CBC: its “public” and 
“subnational” nature, and its concern with “practical problem-solving” and “stabilization” (ibid.).  
CBC involves public, subnational authorities from at least two different countries as its “main 
protagonists”, who “are normally not legal subjects according to international law” (and thus 
cannot legally “conclude international treaties with foreign authorities”, being still dependent 
upon national authorities for these matters) (ibid., emphasis his).  Furthermore, cooperation 
efforts focus on “practical problem-solving” of a wide range of administrative concerns, 
involving “institution-building”, or a “certain stabilization of cross-border [institutional] contacts 
[…] over time” (ibid., emphasis his).  In this way, CBC focuses on harnessing pragmatic 
solutions to issues in the local border area.   
CBRs and CBC initiatives have been pursued through both formal and informal 
agreements between states, subnational and supranational actors.  The nature of CBRs and their 
CBC initiatives varies widely throughout Europe, in regards to “geographical scope” (size and 
number of regions involved), “co-operation intensity” (measured in the CBR managing 
authorities’ “degree of autonomy vis-à-vis central state and other authorities”) and “type of 
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actors” (local, municipal vs. regional (“meso-level”) authorities) (Perkmann 2003: 159).  In 
regards to the “type of actors”, it should be noted that many instances of CBC take place between 
actors at different levels, such as the uneven management of Interreg II
1
 at the Spanish-French 
border by Spanish meso-level (regional) “Autonomous Community” leadership collaborating 
alongside French central state authorities (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009: 751).   
 
2.2 The historical roles of the Council of Europe and the European Union 
 
On the supranational level, the development of CBRs and CBC initiatives can be 
attributed primarily to the legal leadership of the Council of Europe (CoE), accompanied by the 
policymaking and financial support of the European Union’s (EU) European Commission (the 
EU’s legislative institution; hereafter the “Commission”) (Perkmann 2003: 154).  In the domain 
of CBC, it is essential to understand the role of the former in order to recognize that of the latter.  
The CoE is a supranational organization founded in 1949, whose forty-seven member countries 
pursue the development of common and democratic principles, the rule of law, and the protection 
of human rights and cultural diversity (Council 2012).  In 1980, the members of the CoE signed 
the so-called “European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities”, otherwise known as the “Madrid Convention”.  The Convention 
declares the importance of transnational unity and cooperation in Europe, lauding the efficiency 
provided by intranational horizontal cooperation
2
 between local and regional authorities (Council 
1980).  The CoE is careful to emphasize the sovereignty of preexisting national laws in 
constructing “transfrontier cooperation” projects.  Indeed, the first “formal” supranational legal 
                                                 
1
 The EU’s “Interreg” program is explained in the following sections. 
2
 That is, local-local, region-region, national-national cooperation relationships; local-region, region-national, or 
local-national would be vertical cooperation, for example. 
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agreement for CBC is relatively unbinding on its signatories, “intended for guidance only and to 
have no treaty value” (ibid.).  Within the document, the CoE also gives a comprehensive list of 
“model inter-state agreements” and “outline agreements, contracts and statutes” for participating 
parties to utilize as needed when establishing “transfrontier” (e.g., cross-border) cooperation 
projects (ibid.). 
  Until the signing of the Madrid Convention in 1980, CBRs were relatively informal 
agreements based largely around the “twin association”, wherein willing municipalities and 
districts developed a cross-border agreement only after forming an association under their own 
national legal systems (Perkmann 2003: 155).  Even throughout the 1960s and 1970s, local 
authorities were denied decisionmaking authority on issues such as cross-border spatial planning 
or transportation policy (ibid.).  However, the Madrid Convention laid down the legal 
groundwork necessary for bi- and multinational CBC managed by subnational governance 
structures (such as municipalities or regional governments), in addition to practical document 
frameworks that subnational authorities could utilize.  Local and regional entities could now 
more accessibly “enter a field long reserved for central state actors” (Perkmann 2003: 154).  
Nevertheless, it was also understood that “Euroregions and other structures for cross-border 
cooperation do not create a new type of government at the cross-border level”:  CBRs do not 
exercise their own political powers, and “their work is limited to the competencies of the local 
and regional authorities that constitute them” (Lepik 2009: 269).  Bearing these limitations in 
mind, the EU’s CBC policies and financial resources aided the growth begun by the CoE’s 
Madrid Convention. 
The foundational difference between the CoE and the EU in encouraging CBC is that 
“the more legalistic approach favoured by the Council of Europe – proposing CBRs as formal 
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politico-administrative entities – was later abandoned in favour of a more pragmatic and 
economically oriented approach within the context of EU regional policy” (Perkmann 2003: 
155).  What began as informal Dutch and German efforts to promote European economic 
integration, by smoothing out regional imbalances within and between states, began to take 
ideological ground in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.  At that time, member states of the European 
Community (EC)
3
 stated that they were “[a]nxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and 
to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences between the various regions 
and the backwardness of the less favoured regions” (Treaty of Rome cited in Faludi 2009: 7).  
While this declaration was the extent of regionally-focused activity at that point, Germany and 
the Netherlands soon demonstrated their willingness to unify their economies and societies more 
extensively at national boundary lines.  Within months of the Treaty of Rome entering into force, 
the Dutch-German “EUREGIO” project became the first “official” CBR, linking together the 
areas of Enschede (Netherlands) and Gronau (Germany) in 1958 (Faludi 2009: 8)
4
.  States 
confirmed their desire for deeper integration at borders, although it would take almost twenty 
years before the EC would offer practical tools with which to pursue it.   
During this time, a strategy for regional development was forming within the growing 
European Community (EC) (Commission 2012d)
5
.  In 1968, the EC created the position of 
Directorate-General for Regional Policy within the Commission, with a mission to “strengthen 
economic, social and territorial cohesion by reducing disparities between the levels of 
development of regions and countries of the European Union” (Commission 2012e).  1975 saw 
the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), with which the EC 
                                                 
3
 The predecessor to the EU, also known as the “European Economic Community”, which formally became the 
“European Union” with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.  
4
 See Faludi’s (2009) article for a detailed history of EU regional and cohesion policy. 
5
 Unless otherwise noted, the information in this paragraph is taken from this source. 
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could support its regions in a more tangible way.  In 1988, following the entry of economically-
underdeveloped Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) the EC integrated Structural Funds 
(including the ERDF) into an official “cohesion policy”, aimed to strategically invest in the most 
underdeveloped European regions alongside regional and local partners.  Andreas Faludi 
summarizes the policy’s motivation: “[t]he rationale of EU cohesion policy [is] that people 
should not be disadvantaged by where they happen to live and work” (2009: 4).  The policy aims 
for the balanced (“harmonious”) and sustainable development of all regions within the EU’s 
borders (Goulet, ed. 2008: 1).   
Soon after, in 1990, the EC launched the “Interreg-A Community Initiative” to 
specifically target border regions, who were typically among the poorest regions in Europe due 
to their peripheral location, often far from economic hubs and state capitals (Faludi 2009: 8-10).   
Born within the ideological vein of the Treaty of Rome and the CoE’s Madrid Convention, the 
Commission’s Interreg-A project was designed “to dismantle the barriers of the European Union 
(EU) border regions and to prepare them for the new challenges of increasing European 
integration” (Medeiros 2010: 434).  The Interreg program lasted until 1993; it was immediately 
followed by Interreg II (1993-1999) and Interreg III (2000-2006) (Commission 2012a).  With 
Interreg-A, the EU added what the Council of Europe’s initial legislative work had been missing:  
financial support to make substantive CBC possible.  When combined with the growing cohesion 
policy, and the drastically-lowered barriers to travel and economic activity provided by the 1985 
Schengen Agreement and 1992 Single Market, cooperation now had room to flourish.  As a 
result, “today there are virtually no local or regional authorities in border areas that are not 
somehow involved in [CBC] initiatives” (Perkmann 2003: 153).   
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Through its cohesion policy and Interreg programs, the European Union currently pours 
€5.6 billion into fifty-two cross-border structures spread across its internal borders, in an effort to 
“reduce the significant economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist between 
Europe’s regions to strengthen the Single Market and euro currency”, although not all borders lie 
between eurozone member countries (Commission 2012a).  Cohesion policy works toward 
multiple contemporary EU priorities.  It is an arm of the EU’s “Europe 2020 strategy”, envisaged 
in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which lays out the EU’s development goals in five main areas: 
employment, innovation, climate change, education and poverty (Commission 2012b).  The 
policy was also part of the 2000-2010 “Lisbon Strategy”, which set out to make the EU “the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Parliament 2000).  
Finally, cohesion policy works toward the fulfillment of the 2001 “Gothenburg Agenda”, whose 
environmental aspect complements the Lisbon Strategy, prioritizing climate change, sustainable 
transport, public health and resource management (Council 2001).  Thus, the EU views support 
of border regions and CBC as a crucial element to broader objectives for the economy, society 
and public administration. 
The EU demonstrates its stance financially as well.  Cohesion policy acts as the EU’s 
umbrella framework by which it commands Structural Funds (including the ERDF), Cohesion 
Funds and the European Social Fund, guided by three central policy objectives focused on 
regions: Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment, and European Territorial 
Cooperation (ETC) (Commission 2012c).  The first two objectives both concern regional 
economic development, but for the purposes of studying CBC specifically, the ETC objective is 
most relevant.  The 2007-2013 ETC replaces the Interreg program, which expired with the 2007 
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Treaty of Lisbon.  It is funded by the ERDF:  €8.7 billion in Structural Funds set aside to 
subsidize cross-border (€5.6 billion), transnational (€1.8 billion) and interregional (€445 million) 
cooperation programs in Europe.  Through ETC, the Commission subsidizes cross-border 
projects run by local authorities in CBRs within the EU’s borders, parsing out Structural Funds 
to border regions per the “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics” (NUTS) territorial 
classification, which divides up nations into regions
6
.  From there, “Steering Committees” 
involving subnational and national authorities allocate funds to CBC projects that met the 
specified criteria of the CBRs “Operational Programme”, which formally defines the CBR’s 
objectives, priorities and strategies.  One of these Programmes is currently uniting the border of 
Spain and Portugal.   
 
2.3 Operational Programme for Cross-border Cooperation: Spain-Portugal, 2007-2013 
 
On October 25, 2007, the European Commission approved the “Operational Programme 
for Cross-border Cooperation: Spain-Portugal, 2007-2013” (Programa Operacional de 
Cooperação Transfronteiriça Espanha-Portugal, 2007-2013), abbreviated “POCTEP” (Joint 
2009).  Designed to meet the ETC objective for the westernmost regions in the Iberian Peninsula, 
POCTEP received some €267,405,976 in funding from the European Commission via the ERDF.  
The other €86,618,564 came from the Spanish and Portuguese governments, moving the total 
budget for the program to €354,024,540.  POCTEP spans the entire length of the Hispano-Luso 
border, covering seventeen NUTS III border regions and sixteen NUTS III regions adjacent to 
those regions.  Additionally, this entire NUTS III area was further divided into five “Cooperation 
Areas”, equivalent to CBRs: Galicia-Norte de Portugal, Norte de Portugal-Castilla y León, 
                                                 
6
 For a detailed explanation of the NUTS territorial classification system, see Eurostat (2007).  
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Castilla y León-Centro, Centro-Extremadura-Alentejo, and Alentejo-Algarve-Andalucía, with 
some projects being conducted on the all-inclusive “Pluri-regional” scale, encompassing the 
entire border area.  Not including the NUTS III adjacent regions, this ambitious program covers 
some 23.5% of the Iberian Peninsula.  At the time of its establishment in 2007, this area included 
10.6% of the population and roughly 9.6% of employment, but with only 7.5% of Iberian GNP. 
Figure 2.1: POCTEP territory (D.G. 2011) 
 
         Participating NUTS III border areas are gray; adjacent areas are striped. 
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Historically-speaking, these figures only tell part of the story.  The border regions of 
Spain and Portugal, joining two economically-weak Western European states (both shedding off 
dictatorships in the 1970s), were immediately targeted to receive first-generation Interreg-A 
funding upon their accessions (Medeiros 2010: 4).  The region boasted the longest internal EU 
border at the time, stretching some 1,234 km, and one of the longest standing – unchanged since 
its establishment in the Alcañices Treaty, signed between the kings of Castilla y León (Fernando 
IV) and Portugal (Don Dinis) in 1297 (Ferreira 2010: 30; Medeiros 2010:4).  This space was 
characterized by low population densities (40 inhabitants/km
2
 vs. 91 inhabitants/km
2
 in the rest 
of the Iberian Peninsula, leading to a lack of “dynamic centers and cities”), along with a negative 
population growth from 1991-2004: 0.12%/year compared to the rest of the Iberian Peninsula’s 
1.0%/year (D.G. 2011: 24; Medeiros 2010: 4).  The border area also suffered from poor cross-
border coordination between local public institutions, as well as communication problems 
resulting from differences between cultures and languages (Medeiros 2010: 4).  Levels of 
education were low (18.64% of the population had no education), the population was aging 
(19.93% above 65 years), while GDP (7.43%) and GDP per capita (7.75%) were low in 
comparison to its demographic (10.6%) and employment (9.6%) shares in Spain and Portugal 
(D.G. 2001: 25, 27).  Overall, the border region has struggled socially and economically.  The 
area has thus attracted much attention from the EU’s cohesion policy and Interreg program:  
2,179 ERDF-sponsored projects with over €2.67B in funding over the last twenty-one years, 
through Interreg-A, II-A and III-A (Medeiros 2010: 7).  With POCTEP under the ETC objective, 
the EU has approved and funded an expansive effort to infuse the struggling border economies 
with nearly half of a billion euros to spur development. 
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2.4 POCTEP Strategy 
 
The entire POCTEP program is managed by the Directorate General of Community 
Funds within the Spanish Department of Economy and Finance (Joint 2009).  The program aims 
to “develop further and broaden the common border areas of both countries”, through improved 
connectivity in regards to both transportation infrastructures (e.g., highways, roads, rail, etc.) and 
socio-economic linkages (e.g., employment, institutional bodies, etc.) (ibid.).  The POCTEP 
program lists five main priorities, or “axes”7 on which to focus (ibid.).   
Axis one (roughly €94.5 million; 35% of total ERDF funds) endeavors to unite cross-
border research centers in the interest of joint development and innovation, using information 
and communication technologies to encourage growth and the improvement of public services, 
developing local economies in the areas of competitiveness and job creation, and creating more 
and stronger linkages between companies and organizations to promote cross-border 
employment.  Axis two (roughly €77.5 million; 28.7% of total ERDF funds) focuses on 
sustainability: coordinating and managing cultural and environmental infrastructures, services 
and initiatives, as well as disaster prevention and intervention.  POCTEP’s third axis (roughly 
€58.2 million; 21.8% of total ERDF funds) concerns the development and management of cross-
border transportation systems and infrastructures, as well as renewable energy resources.  The 
project’s fourth axis (roughly €22.8 million; 8.5% of total ERDF funds) aims at establishing 
“permanent cross-border cooperation networks between local authorities, companies, social 
organisations and public institutions”, for the purposes of coordinating sustainable social (e.g., 
health and social assistance services), educational, cultural (e.g., tourism, fine arts, etc.), sports 
and leisure services.  Finally, axis five (roughly €16 million; 6% of total ERDF funds) stresses 
                                                 
7
 “Eixos” in Portuguese or “Ejes” in Spanish  
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the importance of financially supporting administrative, monitoring, and evaluative processes 
related to POCTEP initiatives.  Although these axes are all explicitly geared toward development 
in the border region, there is no explicit mention of the present financial or sovereign debt crises 
in Spain or Portugal, perhaps because POCTEP was established in 2007, before the two nations 
experienced the brunt of the collapse.   
These five axes are pursued through “projects” initiated and executed by citizens on both 
sides of the border.  Participants come from state authorities, public companies, subnational 
governance institutions, universities, and research entities, among others (Joint 2009).  POCTEP 
requires that project partners come from both sides of the Hispano-Luso border rather than just 
one, to encourage the highest level of CBC.  Current projects reveal the breadth of POCTEP’s 
scope, ranging from the joint development of interactive electronic blackboards, to the 
establishment of an “International Iberian Nanotechnology Laboratory”, to an outreach program 
against drug addiction (POCTEP 2012).   
 
2.5 Three Eurocities 
 
One of the projects currently taking advantage of POCTEP’s resources is the so-called 
“Chaves-Verín Eurocity” (Eurocidade Chaves-Verín), situated within the Galicia-North Portugal 
(Galicia-Norte de Portugal) euroregion.  The project has received significant funding, once for 
the so-called “Chaves-Verín Eurocity” (Eurociudad Chaves – Verín) project for €1,000,183.65 
and again for the ““Chaves-Verín Eurocity II” (Eurociudad Chaves-Verín II) project for 
€604,994.77, bringing the total from January 2008 until December 2012 to €1,605,178.42 in 
Structural Funds (POCTEP 2012a).  The project presents itself as somewhat of an extensive 
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town “twinning” arrangement reminiscent of the early years of CBC: the two cities come 
together to reach common development goals (cf. Perkmann 2003: 155). 
However, it is not the only such endeavor.  Presently, three “Eurocity” projects are in 
different stages of development along the Hispano-Luso border, each tying together a set of 
Portuguese and Spanish towns:  Chaves and Verín, Tui and Valença, and Elvas and Badajoz.  
The former two have been officially recognized as such, formally signed into being by the local 
governments, while the latter has yet to materialize de juri (Cano 2011: 19; “Eurocidade”; 
Gonzáles 2012).  So far, only the Chaves-Verín Eurocity (CVE) has received funding from the 
EU through POCTEP.  However, the “Tui-Valença Eurocity” (TVE: Eurocidade/Eurociudad 
Tui-Valença) and “Elvas-Badajoz Eurocity” (EBE: Eurocidade/Eurociudad Elvas-Badajoz) 
openly seek EU funding; the city of Badajoz is already receiving some POCTEP funds for the 
development of cultural heritage sites within the municipality (POCTEP 2012b).   
Each project has a different history and context. The CVE ties together the Portuguese 
city of Chaves and the Spanish city of Verín which lie in the regions of Alto Trás-os-Montes and 
Orense/Ourense, respectively.  CVE began with the 1991 creation of the “Galicia-North Portugal 
Working Community” (CTG-NP: Comunidade de Trabalho Galicia-Norte de Portugal), a CBR 
(“Eurocidade”).  Led by the autonomous Galician government body (Xunta: Xunta da Galiza) 
and the “Commission of Coordination and Regional Development of the North Portugal Region” 
(CCDR: Comissão de Coordinação e Desenvolvimento Regional), the CTG-NP was established 
to encourage exchanges between Galicia and North Portugal, as a means of addressing common 
interests in a more-coordinated manner (“Comunidad”).   In order to determine the CTG-NP’s 
institutional authority and function, the “Northwest Peninsular Atlantic Axis” (Eixo: Eixo 
Atlântico do Noroeste Peninsular) was formally established in 1992 (ibid.).   
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Concerned that their region, on the southwestern border of the European Union, be left 
also on the periphery of the Single Market, the Eixo leaders brought together multiple urban 
municipalities within the CTG-NP’s reach into a more-formalized structure, including Verín in 
July of 2007 (Eixo 2012).  Representatives of the Eixo, Xunta, Portuguese Government and the 
Ourense Council (Diputación de Ourense), including the President of the City of Chaves and the 
Mayor of Verín, began to set in motion the formal arrangements for the Eurocity project 
(“Eurocidade”) .  By the end of September, an “Institutional Working Group” (Grupo de 
Trabalho Institucional) – composed of representatives from each institution and residents of the 
municipalities of Chaves and Verín – was organized to gain political support for the project and 
guide its implementation.  On December 18, 2007, the CVE was officially presented to the 
public.  Within a year, the Working Group published the “Eurocity Strategic Agenda”  (Axenda 
Estratéxica da Eurocidade) to more clearly define the political, economic and social objectives 
for the project. 
Only some 100 km west of the CVE and within the CTG-NP, the TVE links the Spanish 
city of Tui (Pontevedra region) and the Portuguese city of Valença do Minho (Minho-Lima 
region) (“Feijóo salienta”).  The project involves some of the same regional partners as the CVE: 
the CCDR and Xunta.  On January 12, 2012, these organizations officially endorsed and 
authorized the creation of the TVE, under the formal leadership of the Mayor of Tui and the 
President of the City of Valença (Gonzáles 2012).  Almost a month later, on February 10, a 
formal constitutional act in Portugal officially recognized the Eurocity (“Queda”). 
 Uniting Portugal’s Elvas and Spain’s Badajoz municipalities (within the Alto Alentejo 
and Badajoz regions, respectively) the EBE project has thus far been guided principally by Luis 
Fernando de la Macorra y Cano and Manuel Martín Lobo, two Spanish individuals from the 
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region (Cano 2011).  The Eurocity’s formation has a long history.  In 1970, before Spain and 
Portugal had shed off their respective dictatorships and joined the European Community, Lobo 
began to publicize the idea of consolidating a cross-border “Badajoz-Elvas Development Pole” 
(Polo de Desarrollo Badajoz-Elvas) connecting the two cities, as part of a broader national 
initiative to help several economically-underdeveloped Spanish cities (ibid.: 9 – 11).  Lobo, an 
engineer with regional development and urban planning expertise, used knowledge of similar 
projects across Europe and the United States to shape his ideas, aided by other European 
professors and high-level political figures (ibid.: 11).  This informal group set up multiple 
Spanish-Portuguese meetings throughout both nations to promote the Pole, which never 
materialized into any physical application.  The 1975 fall of the Spanish régime set in motion the 
State’s transition into a democracy and subsequently a Member State of the EC in 1986, drawing 
attention away from the project.  Thus, the project lay low until 2006 when Cano, an Economics 
professor from the University of Extremadura, began to publish a series of articles and blog 
pieces concerning the project in a well-known Spanish news source (ibid.: 14).  Four years later, 
the so-called “Eurocity Development Agency” (Agencia para el Desarrollo de la Eurociudad) 
brought together local residents and business leaders to begin defining an official plan for the 
development of the project, similar to the CVE’s “Eurocity Strategic Agenda” (Cano 2011: 16).  
The project has yet to be officially recognized by national authorities or funded by the EU.  
 
2.5.1 Economic and demographic challenges 
 
Clearly, each Eurocity project differs, in respect to location, history, leading actors and 
stage of development.  The POCTEP proposal to the European Commission reveals some data 
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gathered from 1991-2003 concerning these six municipalities.  Overall, each municipality’s 
region was well behind the national averages in terms of GDP per capita and education beyond 
high school; most have higher than average infant mortality rates (ibid.: 45).  Alto Trás-os-
Montes, the Portuguese region containing Chaves, had one of the lowest GDP growth rates 
among border regions at 11.5% (D.G. 2011: 27).  In 2003, GDP per capita in the border region 
averaged €12,163 euros (only 70.94% of the non-border region average of €17,146); Ourense 
(Verín’s region) (€13,698) and Pontevedra (Tui) (€14,276) did particularly well, while Alto 
Trás-os-Montes (Chaves) performed especially poorly (€7,464) (ibid.: 28).  Data showed 2000-
2003 growth in GDP per capita in Pontevedra (Tui), Ourense (Verín) and Alto Alentejo (Elvas) 
(ibid.).  Even so, Pontevedra (Tui) and Badajoz (Badajoz) regions had the largest unemployment 
agencies (ibid.: 25).  The demographic situation was troubling as well.  Ourense (Verín) had a 
notably weak demographic density and a decline in population, influenced by an aging society: 
19.93% were 65 years and over in 2001 vs. 16.92% overall in non-border regions (ibid.: 24).  
Less than 20% of the population of Alto-Trás-os-Montes (Chaves) and Minho-Lima (Valença) 
had at least a secondary school education, while Salamanca, another border region, showed 59%; 
all of Spain averaged 51.6% and Portugal 27.2% (ibid.: 34, 43).  The Ourense (Verín) and 
Badajoz (Badajoz) regions had some of the lowest rates of education: 18.64% of border 
population had no schooling, compared to 13.15% of non-border population (ibid.: 24).  
However, Minho-Lima (Valença), Alto Trás-os-Montes (Chaves) and Alto Alentejo (Elvas) grew 
in terms of rates of higher education from 2000-2003 (ibid.: 30).  In general, the economic and 
demographic situation of these municipalities before POCTEP was disconcerting, and perhaps 
offered strong motivations for crafting the Eurocity initiatives. 
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2.5.2 Outliers  
 
From a scholarly perspective, what makes the Eurocity projects stand out in the realm of 
Hispano-Luso CBC are the depth and breadth of cooperation they seek, and the rhetoric they 
employ.  Rather than pursuing one POCTEP “axis”, these actors appear to aim for all four in a 
single, comprehensive project, utilizing prophetic language when describing their objectives.  
The CVE, for instance, hopes to improve the daily lives of border residents by setting the 
foundation for “Second Generation Cooperation” (Cooperación de Segunda Generación) 
(“Dossier” July 2008: 4), while creating “eurocitizens” (eurociudadanías) within a “European 
laboratory of new citizens” (laboratorio europeo de novas cidadanías) – a goal all three 
Eurocities pursue (“La creación”; Cano 2011: 27; Mao, ed. 2008: 24, 45).  On their part, EBE 
actors envision the re-emergence of “Iberianism” (Iberianismo) and “Southwest Iberia” 
(Sudoeste Ibéria), the latter which has allegedly “always existed as a geoeconomic and social 
area on the Iberian Peninsula”8, maintained formally or informally through the centuries by 
strong neighborly relations spanning the border area (Cano 2011: 6-7, 25).  Moreover, these 
three projects’ activities and objectives address all five POCTEP axes, revealing extensive goals 
for economic, social and institutional development between the border municipalities.  Eurocity 
leaders propose new hospitals, research centers, and transportation infrastructure, along with 
“social cohesion”, the sharing of public services and promotion of bilingualism.  If CBC 
symbolizes the “front lines” of European integration, the Eurocity projects strive to be the 
vanguard of that process.  Insight into these initiatives will help give a needed perspective of 
European CBC and integration, filling in crucial gaps that research has left behind.   
 
                                                 
8
 “El Suroeste Ibérico siempre existió como área geoeconómica y social de la Península Ibérica” (my translation) 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
  The European Union (EU) and Council of Europe (CoE) have made significant legal, 
policy-related, and financial provisions to spur the development of cross-border cooperation 
(CBC) in Europe.  These policy tools and financial resources affect Hispano-Luso border regions 
in significant ways, as evidenced in POCTEP and the development of the three “Eurocity” 
projects.  However, before these latter initiatives can be analyzed, a review of literature 
surrounding other European CBC will be carried out, to further set the context for these projects.  
The specific challenges experienced and lessons learned by other CBC initiatives must be 
explored, in order shed light on the challenges of cooperation faced by Eurocities and to make 
sense of the projects’ objectives. 
 
3.2 Theories of European integration  
 
Rooted in the transcendence of national boundary lines, research of CBC gives a crucial 
lens through which to examine the development of European integration, from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives.  Moving forward, it is necessary to briefly explain two competing 
theories of European integration – the so-called “intergovernmentalism” and “multi-level 
governance” models – in order to provide a framework through which to interpret empirical 
research discoveries in “border studies” research.    
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Moravcsik’s “liberal intergovernmentalist” theory of European integration has three 
components:  the formation of national preferences, an “intergovernmental model of EU-level 
bargaining” between “important governments”, and a “model of institutional choice emphasizing 
the role of international institutions in providing ‘credible commitments’ for member 
governments” (Moravcsik 1998: 3; Pollack 2010: 20)9.   It is a description of how nation-states 
approach integration
10
 of political, social and economic policies and institutions with their 
neighbors on the international level.  First, “national chiefs of government (COGs)” combine 
their interests with those of their domestic constituency, focused centrally on economic 
incentives (the so-called “patterns of commercial advantage”) (ibid.).  Next, national 
governments take these preferences to the EU institutions.  The European Commission and other 
supranational organizations have marginal if any influence in the policymaking process; rather, 
outcomes are determined by the “relative power” of each member state (ibid.).  Finally, once 
these states have bargained to protect and advance their various domestic interests at the 
supranational level, they seek to “increase the credibility of their commitments” through 
adopting EU institutions and allotting sovereignty to supranational actors (such as the 
Commission) for the purposes of monitoring these international commitments, in order that no 
state succumbs to the very present temptation “to cheat or ‘defect’ from their agreements” (ibid.).  
In the end, supranational actors play only a minor role, while national governments primarily 
                                                 
9
 Moravcsik arrives at these three theoretical components through pursuing three questions: “First, what best 
explains national preferences, the fundamental motivations underlying support for or opposition to economic 
integration?  Second, given a set of national preferences, what best explains outcomes of interstate bargaining within 
the EC?  Third, given a set of substantive bargains, what best explains state choices to construct European 
institutions and transfer sovereignty to them?” (1998: 5).   
10
 defined by Moravcsik as “a process in which [governments] define a series of underlying objectives or 
preferences, bargain to substantive agreements concerning cooperation, and finally select appropriate international 
institutions in which to embed them” (1998: 5). 
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drive European integration and retain control over directing the EU’s institutions and 
policymaking: state sovereignty is thus neither diluted nor skirted
11
.   
Originally developed by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, the “multi-level governance” 
(MLG) model of European integration stands in deliberate opposition to the intergovernmentalist 
position
12.  The theory rests on three claims.  First, “decision-making competencies” are not 
“monopolized by state executives”, but “shared by actors at different levels” of government – 
national, subnational and supranational (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996: 346, emphases mine).  
Supranational institutions exert “independent influence in policymaking” and are not merely 
“agents of state executives” which exist to aid member states and “facilitate agreements by 
providing information that would not otherwise be so readily available” (Marks et. al. 1996: 346; 
342).  Secondly, individual state sovereignty is diluted by collective decisionmaking at the EU 
level, contrary to Moravcsik’s assertion.  In this process, Marks et. al. claim that “[d]ecisions 
concerning rules to be enforced across the EU […] have a zero-sum character”, as some states 
experience gains (via favorable decisions), others losses (ibid.: 346).  Third and finally, 
“subnational actors operate at both the national and supranational arenas” rather than being 
contained domestically within national forums: for subnational actors, political arenas are 
therefore “interconnected” rather than “nested” (ibid.).  The conclusions of the MLG model are 
clear: “[w]hile national governments are formidable participants in EU policy-making, control 
has slipped away from them to supranational institutions” (Marks et. al. 1996: 342-43).  
The MLG approach can be traced to Marks’ earlier work on the formation and 
implementation of EU Structural Funds (one of which is the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), which has supported the Interreg and European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) 
                                                 
11
 “The integration process did not supercede or circumvent the political will of national leaders; it reflected their 
will” (Moravcsik 1998: 4, emphasis his).   
12
 Referred to in Marks et. al. as the “state-centric model” (1996: 343).   
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initiatives) (Pollack 2010)
13
.  According to Marks, the design and implementation of Structural 
Funds provided evidence that supranational institutions (especially the Commission) and local 
and regional governments were gaining powers vis-à-vis national structures (Pollack 2010: 36).  
In this way, a “multi-level” system of governance was developing as national, subnational and 
supranational actors became mutually dependent upon one another and on “new public-private 
policy networks transcending all three levels” (i.e., vertically-“interconnected” political arenas) 
to plan and implement policies (ibid.).  Although later studies re-emphasized the authority of 
member state governments over Structural Funds relative to sub- and supranational actors, the 
MLG position has adapted to weather criticism, with proponents employing “policy network” 
theory to further explore the “interconnected” nature of EU policymaking arenas and the actors 
within them (ibid.).  These two theories – intergovernmentalism and MLG – often apply to the 
discussion of contemporary CBC in the EU.  Their theoretical frameworks help clarify the 
continued barriers posed by national boundaries, particularly in regards to issues in CBC and 
CBR governance. 
 
3.3 “Border studies” scholarship: rationale, history and focus 
 
“Borders studies” scholars have arisen to investigate CBC and CBRs, including those in 
contemporary Europe.  Presently, coverage of European CBC and the cross-border regions 
(CBRs or “euroregions”)14 that facilitate cooperation is still not entirely comprehensive.  
Imbalances exist in relation to which border locales are studied (Ireland/Northern Ireland; 
Scandinavia; BeNeLux/Germany/France), and which are not (most of Central and Eastern 
                                                 
13
 For an explanation of the ERDF, ETC and Interreg, please see the “Background” chapter. 
14
 For more information on CBRs or “Euroregions”, the institutionalized structures that facilitate CBC, please see 
the “Background” chapter. 
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Europe; Spain/Portugal).  Pan-EU or –regional efforts are sometimes too expansive to answer 
why specific challenges arise in particular border locales, while smaller-scale endeavors give so 
much weight to local CBC context that broader implications are often considered risky to draw 
out (cf. Häkli and Kaplan 2002: 13).   
Scholarly research has moved towards the “people” or “grassroots” level, looking at 
cooperation through the eyes of its participants, rather than exclusively economic indicators or 
“institutional discourse” found in Brusselian or national documents (Harguindéguy and Bray 
2009; Prokkola 2011).  This shift occurred as investigations into CBC began looking more 
closely at the disparities between objectives imposed from the top downward (including those 
from the Interreg program) and on-the-ground behavior. “Top-down” quantitative analyses of the 
permeability of European borders did little to describe the specific challenges faced by local 
actors and residents on the border, giving raw numbers but no way to explain their local origin.  
To scholars, it remained unclear whether Interreg and similar initiatives were more symbolic 
than substantial (Prokkola 2011).  Studying policy, strategy or official documentation alone was 
often deemed inadequate, as participants of cooperation were shown to actively react to and 
modify the implementation of these CBC policies, often in unpredicted ways (Popescu 2008).  
EU-backed analyses were informative but insufficient, exacting frank analyses of quantitative 
data at the expense of the broader socio-political-cultural context, leaving readers overwhelmed 
and without a coherent perspective.  Additionally, Lawrence’s (2011) case study of CBC across 
Central and Eastern Europe suggested that the nature of the Commission’s evaluations of 
Interreg programs’ performance may be unhelpful and even hinder future progress in the CBC 
initiatives themselves, giving an inaccurate picture of projects’ value, needs and lessons learned.  
In highlighting the shortcomings of top-down external evaluation by the EU, he encourages the 
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use of “a more locally driven form of evaluation” to identify successes, as his study’s grassroots 
perspective drew a very different picture than the supranational appraisal (2011: 376).   
 Moving towards a “bottom-up” vantage point, researchers began to discover that the 
results of CBC initiatives varied widely within and among member states for a host of reasons, 
including policymaking structures, political parties, institutional fund and project management, 
degrees of decentralization, entrepreneurialism and others (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009).   
Scholars called for deeper investigation into the different societal factors and their effects on 
cooperation in order to explain differences across Europe (Valls 2004: 138).  It was unknown 
how consistently historical, political and identity issues affected cooperation throughout Europe, 
or if factors were highly context-specific (Wilson 2000: 8).  Häkli and Kaplan argued, 
“[i]nstitutional actors’ accounts of the development of European borderlands should be balanced 
with equal interest focused on how the residents of borderlands experience the changes at the 
level of everyday life” (2002: 13).  Thus, not only viewpoints of actors participating directly in 
CBC initiatives, but those of border residents as well have been examined to evaluate strengths 
and challenges to cooperation.  Seminal border studies author David Newman summarizes,  
“Borders should be studied not only from a top-down perspective, but also from the 
bottom up, with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences, reflecting 
the ways in which borders impact upon the daily life practices of people living in and 
around the borderland and transboundary transition zones.” (2006: 143). 
 
In doing so, Newman calls for a directional shift in the research of interaction at the frontiers of 
states, advocating a re-focus on local perspective to provide a more complete understanding of 
CBC.  How are traditional dividing lines making the transition into foci of cooperation?  A closer 
examination of historical, social, political, economic, identity and cultural dynamics is required if 
physical and theoretical borders are to be successfully breached (cf. Wilson 2000).  
28 
 
Thus, grassroots approaches have come to the fore, explicitly or implicitly assuming that 
a fuller understanding the environment in which participants operate is just as (if not more) 
essential to understanding how and why CBC projects reach their objectives or not.  Local 
context becomes the means of investigating cooperation, as the particular settings of individual 
borders appear to have a significant effect on proliferation of CBC (Sidaway 2001).  When 
researchers neglect the inherent “context-bound character” of borders, they risk making incorrect 
or unhelpful generalizations and interpretations, not giving due regard to the daily life of local 
CBC actors and border residents in determining the nature and degree of cooperation (Paasi and 
Prokkola 2008: 26).  This focus on context limits somewhat the possibility to extrapolate CBC 
findings to other locales; however, this is generally seen as preferable to exclusively pan-EU 
assertions, which can be inaccurate due to their breadth
15
 (Häkli and Kaplan 2002).   
Contemporary “border studies” literature has developed out of the “boundary studies” 
field, in which scholars focused on the demarcation and classification of political lines, explored 
their abstract nature, and problematized their geographical placement as a cause of friction 
between states (Häkli and Kaplan 2002).  “Border studies” scholarship has shifted away from “a 
more naturalistic paradigm” towards investigating the “social construction of boundaries”; that 
is, the societal factors that either dissolve or solidify borders (2002: 2).  Scholars from a wide 
variety of disciplines and backgrounds have coalesced into what is currently a truly 
multidisciplinary group:  geography and its sub-disciplines “human geography” and “political 
geography”, urban studies, anthropology, social psychology, sociology, political science, history, 
and even tourism studies are all represented in the field.  Culturally-minded scholars investigate 
                                                 
15
 “Any attempts at generalisation must be balanced by an awareness of the local and regional surroundings.  Each 
case occurs within a specific cultural and political milieu.  As much as we need theories about trends and similarities 
across various borderlands, our understanding of these changes remains incomplete if we do not appreciate the 
differences in outcomes that prevail in Europe and elsewhere” (Häkli and Kaplan 2002: 13).   
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the relationship of boundaries with identity, spilling over into analyses of the context-specific 
“politicization of identities” (e.g., nationalism, majority-minority relations, and “stateless 
nations” or groups that span two or more states, such as the Basques or Catalans in Spain and 
France).  Politically-oriented studies have focused on how the national sovereignty, hegemony 
and consolidation of power affect territorial boundaries.  From an economic perspective, scholars 
investigate the effects of deepening integration and transnational interconnectedness to analyze 
borders as barriers to the free flows of economic transactions.   
In the realm of “border studies”, many authors identify themselves as “new regionalists”.  
“New regionalism” 16 theorizes “cross-national/community interaction and interdependencies” on 
a global scale, exploring cross-border and international relationships (Söderbaum 2003: 1).  New 
regionalism scholars explore how regions are defined socio-culturally and politically, as well as 
the functionality and efficacy of different types of regions.  Rather than being “confined” to 
formal relationships between regional organizations and institutions, new regionalism is 
“characterized by its multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and by the 
fact that it involves a variety of state and non-state actors, who often come together in rather 
informal multi-actor coalitions” (ibid.: 1-2).  Therefore, new regionalism typically follows the 
MLG model of diverse public and private actors on different levels driving integration and 
cooperation, rather than the intergovernmentalist approach:  scholars attempt to “move beyond 
state-centric assumptions” (ibid.: 7).   
In the light of “new regionalism”, scholars have contested the “Europe of the regions”17 
(EoR) hypothesis, explored most notably by Michael Keating (Jones and Keating, eds. 1995).  
EoR posits that as state competence is simultaneously eroded from above (through European 
                                                 
16
 See Söderbaum and Shaw (2003) for extensive discussions of the contested “new regionalism” paradigms. 
17
 See Jones and Keating, eds. (1995) for an overview of “Europe of the regions” scholarship. 
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integration) and below (through regionalism), a “new political regime is created, in which 
national governments are no longer masters of the game and, in extreme versions, states 
disappear altogether in favour of a Europe of the Regions” (Keating 1995: 10).  From a 
governance perspective, EoR is consistent with the MLG model of integration.  Pragmatically-
minded observers argue that “the nation-state will become functionally redundant” as powers are 
efficiently decentralized between the EU and the regions; others (“romantics, utopians, ethnic 
activists”) envision a Europe of “‘natural’ ethnic or spatial communities” in lieu of the 
“‘artificial’ and oppressive structures of the nation state” (ibid.).  Both may arguably fail to 
adequately take into account the resilience of national power, deficits of common interests within 
and among regions, or the wide variation of economic, institutional, political and social realities 
among regions (ibid.: 20-22).  However, features of the EU’s institutions, Single Market, and 
financial support mechanisms all lend support to the claim that national authority is being eroded 
from above and below (ibid.: 11-19). 
The following sections will attempt to bring into focus the central empirical findings 
concerning obstacles to European CBC from the last quarter century.  The literature focuses 
around two principal categories of challenges to CBC within the EU, intertwined:  barriers posed 
by governance and by society and culture.  Conclusions from scholarship on both these 
hindrances to cooperation shed light on this thesis’s examination of Hispano-Luso Eurocities.   
 
3. 4 Governance-related barriers to CBC 
 
Scholars analyzing European CBC have utilized both intergovernmentalism and MLG to 
interpret different features observed in cooperation.  Some have argued that traditional “realist” 
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or intergovernmentalist analyses have become inadequate, as the integration led by the EU has 
forever changed the significance of national borders, authority and power (Sidaway 2001; 
Popescu 2008).  The forces of globalization and the growing EU mean that national governments 
are no longer the sole political authorities in the world.  Harguindéguy and Bray note that CBC 
initiatives are “particularly well adapted” to the MLG model, in which European institutions 
(e.g., those of the EU and Council of Europe) have gained significant political power in respect 
to the nation-state (2009: 749).  Scholars have suggested that CBC takes place simultaneously on 
multiple “scales” – subnational, national, supranational and global – in a MLG environment, 
adding a healthy measure of complexity to the creation and maintenance of CBRs 
(Harguindéguy and Bray 2009).  Contemporary CBC takes place through “complex vertical 
integration networks” which vary significantly from state to state, with overlapping authority, 
sovereignty and decisionmaking structures operating concurrently on each scale (ibid.: 757).  
From a pragmatic standpoint, when decentralized to varying degrees across European nations, 
decisionmaking hierarchies can easily become somewhat opaque.  A “bureaucratic maze” of 
different government departments, aided by the complexity of Interreg measures and application 
processes, sometimes combine to unintentionally discourage local participation and enthusiasm 
(Wilson 2000).   
Both the EU and its member states have done much to devolve regional sovereignty away 
from the national and toward sub- and supranational levels of governance in CBC-related issues.  
National, subnational and supranational authorities see this as their chance to have a more direct 
route to the affected population, and are often willing to relinquish degrees of control to more 
localized governance structures for gained efficiency in local implementation and oversight 
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(Perkmann 2006; cf. Sabel and Zeitlin 2008)
18
.  Decentralization has been seen as a more 
“efficient” way to express more interests and uphold the legitimacy of implemented policies 
(Harguindéguy and Bray 2009: 748).  Thus, empirical border studies scholars have supported the 
theory of MLG.    
However, research has also revealed features of European CBC that endorse a more 
“intergovernmentalist” understanding.  National administration, institutions and law continue to 
play a central role in determining the extent of cooperation.  Cross-border regions (CBRs), while 
illustrating “the loosening of the straitjacket” of traditional national territorial structure, are still 
“far from being the autonomous political-territorial units in the world political system” (Popescu 
2008: 435).  In his pan-European survey of CBRs, Perkmann finds that overall, “states have been 
reluctant to grant these new cross-border agencies more than the responsibility to carry out rather 
ordinary policy functions” (2003: 167).  National sovereignty and territorial boundaries still 
matter, in both a practical and conceptual sense.  From a pragmatic standpoint, Eeva-Kaisa 
Prokkola, in her examination of Finnish-Swedish CBC, concludes that “national regulations […] 
are extremely difficult to bypass” (2011: 1205).  Rather than a straightforward process of 
bypassing national boundaries, researchers and CBC actors find that “it is [still] the state border 
which determines the norms and spatial organization of […] cooperation” (Prokkola 2011: 1).   
This “intergovernmentalist” situation creates problems on the ground.  Harguindéguy and 
Bray’s (2009) study on CBC at the Spanish-French border suggests that the Commission’s 
efforts to circumvent state governments and “empower” regions sometimes fall short.  The 
                                                 
18
 “Lower-level units (such as national ministries or regulatory authorities and the actors with whom they 
collaborate) are given the freedom to advance these ends as they see ﬁt. Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that 
in writing framework rules the lower-level units should be given sufficient autonomy in implementing the rules to be 
able to propose changes to them. But in return for this autonomy, they must report regularly on their performance, 
especially as measured by the agreed indicators, and participate in a peer review in which their results are compared 
with those pursuing other means to the same general ends. Finally, the framework goals, metrics, and procedures 
themselves are periodically revised by the actors who initially established them, augmented by such new participants 
whose views come to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation” (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008: 273-74). 
33 
 
success of “regionalized scheme[s]” seemed to depend in large part on the strength of historical 
institutional authority of subnational structures, with Spain’s “Autonomous Community” 
governments (e.g., Andalucía or Catalunya) receiving the greatest “regional empowerment” and 
“best [Interreg] results” (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009: 757).  On the other hand, due to France’s 
“institutional context of semiliberty” for regional authorities, under-staffed and poorly organized 
subnational structures were only able to forge tepid regional partnerships, inhibiting desired 
results (ibid.: 757-59).   In a different geographical context, Eder and Sandtner argue that 
“nationally differing levels of administrative decision-making powers make the realization of 
[cross-border] projects extremely difficult and time-consuming” in the Swiss-French-German 
Regio TriRhena CBR (2002: 153).  Overall, it appears that higher, more localized competence is 
tied to better CBC “results”, although this authority is not always so forthcoming from national 
institutions.    
Thomas M. Wilson comes to a similar conclusion, in a different location: “[t]he most 
important administrative barrier to cross-border cooperation and economic development has been 
the centralization of the Irish and British states” (2000: 4).   Local authorities’ roles in Interreg 
projects’ design and implementation were limited on both sides of the border, primarily because 
national governmental departments controlled funding (ibid.: 5).  Ironically, this situation has 
been described as somewhat of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: the lack of adequate personnel and 
specialization of local administrative authorities causes decisionmaking to shift outward towards 
regional and national authorities, who are more capable of navigating the “complicated and 
laborious procedures for getting Interreg funding”, but also less aware of specific border issues 
and sometimes even less interested in cooperation (Terlouw 2008: 108; cf. Wilson 2000).  The 
national government is ultimately in control, making only limited concessions to subnational 
34 
 
authorities, whose lagging administrative and institutional capacities allow state governments 
and local residents to deem them “incapable” of acting as more sovereign intermediaries in CBC 
(Harguindéguy and Bray 2009).  These cases of CBC suggest an intergovernmentalist reality, as 
subnational and supranational authorities’ efforts to integrate across national borders appear to be 
hindered by the central state’s dominance in border-related governance.   
A common finding is that higher-level authorities are often “out of touch”, in regards to 
CBC policymaking and project implementation, bypassing local input and interests in favor of 
top-down solutions which struggle to address the reality of border locales.  Spatially, Brussels’ 
“one size fits all scale” for CBRs (based around NUTS divisions19) can promote a significant 
“mismatch” with actual cross-border behavior realities (Terlouw 2008: 113).  On a national 
level, legislation is often created without consideration of its effects on boundary areas, 
inhibiting CBC (Lundén and Zalamans 2001).  Jouni Häkli’s findings in Catalonia suggest that 
cooperation networks led by higher-level authorities sometimes follow their own “functional and 
institutional logic” rather than attending to “people’s everyday concerns”, as evidenced by a 
measured lack of CBC project awareness and participation by local residents per a region-wide 
questionnaire (2002: 89).  This disconnect between non-local and local goals is compounded 
with increasing degrees of state centralization, which by definition not only disempowers more 
localized governance structures, but can nurture “mismatch and disagreement” between local and 
national political and economic objectives and priorities (Wilson 2000: 4).  CBC becomes 
increasingly constrained as local authorities’ roles and competences are limited.   
However, this is not necessarily the condition for every instance of cooperation.  Faced 
with these challenges imposed by national and supranational bodies, local actors sometimes 
                                                 
19
 “NUTS divisions”, the EU’s way of dividing up states into administrative regions, are explained in the 
Background chapter. 
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manage to “amend” policies and projects to varying degrees to better accommodate interests, 
depending on the decisionmaking authority of subnational (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009) or 
national (Popescu 2008) governments.  Löfgren’s (2008) story of the Scandinavian “regionauts” 
who built the multimillion-euro Öresund Bridge spanning from Denmark to Sweden suggests 
that when local political leaders are allowed to take the lead, CBC projects can flourish and real 
economic growth can result, to the benefit of both local and non-local stakeholders.       
Markus Perkmann (2007a), in his case study of the long-standing EUREGIO CBR at the 
Dutch-German border, found that more localized governance structures played an uncommonly 
strong role in cooperation, consistent with the MLG model.  Political support from both sides of 
the border area mobilized to create and maintain these structures, to such an extent that “the 
actors supporting the CBR were almost exclusively local authorities” (Perkmann 2006: 263).  
Unlike the British-Irish case, the EUREGIO authorities had a high level of control over their own 
funds (which were diversified beyond Interreg financial support), meaning a higher amount of 
decisionmaking competence in CBC activities (ibid.: 259-60; cf. Harguindéguy and Bray 2009: 
752, Lepik 2009).  “Horizontal” ties between local policy networks and authorities intersected 
with strong “vertical” ties spanning from subnational to national to supranational authorities, 
composing a well-functioning system of “networked governance”: a sign of MLG and policy 
networks (Perkmann 2006: 259, 263).  Local actors thusly depended upon resources flowing in 
from higher-level authorities, who in turn relied on “the motivational role and decentralized 
intelligence of the local network for the inception and orderly execution of cross-border 
projects”:  cooperation was “scaled down” towards the local level (ibid.).  Although this dynamic 
is indeed the supranational logic of successful CBC (Wilson 2000: 8), the Dutch-German case 
seems to be an exception amidst other research.   
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In a later study, Perkmann calls EUREGIO the “‘model’ European CBR”, for its 
emergence through bottom-up mobilization from local municipalities along the border, its 
“entrepreneurial” leadership via the CBR secretariat, and its development into a “legitimate 
cross-border development agency in its local context” (2007b: 875).  In comparison, the 
Viadrina and Tyrol CBRs (at the Polish-German and Austrian-Italian borders, respectively) 
suffered from the retained control of higher-level authorities at the regional and national level, 
lacking the ability to operate “independently as a cross-border agency” (ibid.).  This leads 
Perkmann to re-assert the importance of stronger decisionmaking powers in the hands of local 
CBR authorities (a strategy he labels “Euroregional policy entrepreneurship”) for “successful” 
cooperation outcomes (ibid.).  His findings suggest that a MLG environment produces more 
effective CBC. 
Perkmann’s three cases suggest that the ability of CBRs to gain influence “is shaped by 
the political-administrative environments in which they operate”, wherein “CBRs are more likely 
to be effective in countries with a strong tradition of municipal autonomy” (ibid.: 875-76).  Thus, 
nations with governance systems similar to Germany’s structure – a decentralized system of 
local authorities consisting of the regional Länder, municipalities and “district-type aggregations 
of municipalities” (the Kreise) – generally have more success in setting localized CBR agendas 
and thus reaching local CBC goals (ibid.).  Nation-states like Germany and Spain which are 
historically willing to give more localized authorities significant autonomy in cooperation 
experience more “effective” CBC; their municipal authorities are “seen as politically 
unproblematic” and local efforts are therefore less resisted by national authorities (Perkmann 
2003: 165).  On the other hand, as evidenced in the case of the Austrian-Italian Tyrol CBR, more 
centralized national governance systems encounter problems more frequently:  in this case, 
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Austrian-Italian CBC has long “hindered by Italian central state authorities”, who fear the 
potential for increased “political capital [of] the German-speaking political elite in South Tyrol” 
(ibid.).   
 
3.5 Socio-cultural barriers to CBC 
 
Apart from challenges related to governance, border studies research has also examined 
historical, ethnic, linguistic and cultural factors for their effects on cooperation, helping to fill in 
the contextual gap that top-down analyses leave behind.  In this light, scholars have revealed the 
challenges posed by societal factors, issues which most often bear the fruit of division rather than 
cross-border regional unification.  Scholars have seen these challenges manifest in various 
patterns across space and time in Europe.       
Although it might be assumed that institutionalized CBC undermines the significance of 
national borders, scholars have suggested that “in the actual practices of co-operation, borders 
are simultaneously both contested and reconstructed, and sometimes even strengthened” (Paasi 
and Prokkola 2008: 27).  While national boundaries may be played down institutionally and 
bureaucratically, “local habits of organizing space and […] work” reify them in such a way that 
“mental borders” effectively replace physical (ibid.).  Perceived social distance can set up a 
significant barrier to regional integration, encouraging anti-foreign actions and attitudes (Kratke 
1998).  Cultural tensions surface as states are compelled to work together in new ways, altering 
everything from “perceptions of abroadness to identity processes” (Löfgren 2008).  Historically-
indoctrinated national stereotypes have been shown to actively breed division, as in the case of 
Finnish-Swedish CBC (Lundén and Zalamans 2001).  When socio-cultural tensions are 
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especially high, cooperation objectives become extremely difficult to fulfill.   The situation 
worsens still if severe historical social and cultural barriers merge with disempowered structures 
of local governance, or even distrust of the government in general, as in the case of the 
“Troubled” border region separating the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) and the Republic of 
Ireland (Wilson 2000; cf. Kuusisto-Arponen 2002).   
J.D. Sidaway’s (2001) study of a failed Interreg-funded bridge spanning the Tagus River 
from Spain to Portugal reveals that “bad blood” flowing from historical contestations of national 
boundary lines can erect significant barriers to cooperation.  Local “irredentist” Portuguese 
political groups on the disputed border of Olivenza (Spanish)/Olivença (Portuguese) discourage 
cooperation through nationalist attitudes (e.g., defining their identity by being “not-Spain”) and 
actions (e.g., such symbolic achievements as “persuading the Portuguese automobile club to 
change the spelling of Olivenza to ‘Olivença’ in its latest road atlas”, and “polemical” articles in 
the Portuguese press) (Sidaway 2001: 759, 65).  Further north in the Spanish region of Galicia, 
José Luís Palmeiro Pinheiro echoes Sidaway’s findings, suggesting that although border 
residents have “common historical and cultural roots”, most still “retain strong ethnic or national 
affiliations and loyalties” (2009: 101).  Simple, everyday practices – such as the differing daily 
organizations of time on each side of the border (Spain operating two hours later in terms of 
work, lunch and leisure times) – join with “historical, ethno-national, legal, administrative, 
economic and territorial characteristics of the border” to inhibit consolidation into a cross-border 
identity (ibid.: 100 – 102).  In the realm of “border studies”, Sidaway and Pinheiro seem to offer 
the only research perspectives on Hispano-Luso CBC. 
Similar to Pinheiro’s findings in the Iberian Peninsula is Gregg Bucken-Knapp’s (2003) 
research of the Öresund/Øresund region connecting Denmark and Sweden, which examines the 
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relative apathy of Danes to participate in CBC with their much more willing Swedish neighbors.  
His findings suggest that the distinct narratives of the “other” – emphasizing the significance of 
differences in “national” culture and behavior – play a significant role in restricting the 
fulfillment of “regional elite” desires of a more integrated CBR (Bucken-Knapp 2003: 55).  
Historical “chauvinism” or nationalism limits consolidation into a more localized identity.  
Politicians and officials falteringly peddle a CBR identity (the so-called “Öresunder”, in this 
case) to encourage more pervasive cooperation, struggling to convince inhabitants that their 
common space translates to shared interests and values (2003: 57-58).  Bucken-Knapp labels 
these officials “cultural entrepreneurs”, who find that the difficulty of CBR “identity-building” is 
compounded by the fact that the boundaries of the Öresund/Øresund region are un-defined and 
thus consistently shifting and expanding (ibid.: 58-59).  Bucken-Knapp’s findings suggest that 
unlike fixed national borders, regions are more often viewed as “artificial constructs” endlessly 
re-shaped, all the more so in CBRs which span more than one state’s administrative framework 
(ibid.: 59-60).  Thus, regions can be counted as irrelevant or in some cases, even meaningless.   
Research also suggests that cooperation is limited as “success” is often evaluated in terms 
of national gains rather than cross-border gains, forgoing CBR benefits in favor of national (Eder 
and Sandtner 2002: 152; Paasi and Prokkola 2008).  Indeed, this became an issue in the first 
iteration of Interreg-A (1989 – 1993), wherein “most projects that received funding […] were 
government-sponsored border-region projects which aided one side of the border or the other but 
did little to improve cross-border cooperation”, despite the fact that these “stand-alone” projects 
were not the target of Interreg-A funding (Wilson 2000: 4).  Thus, nationalism has manifested 
itself throughout border regions in the EU as a socio-cultural barrier hindering CBC. 
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Brigitta Bush (2003) proposes that historical narratives of national identities at the 
Austrian-Slovenian border have helped shape perceptions of the “self” and “other”, which 
emphasize differences over similarities.  She argues that the states’ different languages, serving 
as “key marker[s] of identity”, play a significant role in facilitating division rather than 
cooperation (2003: 125).  The basic ability to communicate meaningfully with one’s cross-
border neighbor is an oft-overlooked requisite of fruitful CBC.  Indeed, a strong positive link 
between bilingualism and cross-border interaction has been found in certain cases: “[t]he ability 
to speak the language of one’s neighbours has significant effects on cross-border activities and 
personal contacts” (Eder and Sandtner 2002: 147).  
Nationalist interests with strong local biases can persevere, even when states strongly 
desire uniting a CBR founded on common economic, political or social interests (Lundén and 
Zalamans 2001).  Such was arguably the case for Häkli’s (2002) study of the Catalán-speaking 
region spanning from northeastern Spain into southwestern France.  Catalonia’s significant 
regional autonomy as one of Spain’s several “Autonomous Communities” led scholars to call it 
“a model for the ‘New Europe’”:  regional “political leaders, economic actors, and cultural elites 
are eagerly entering into relations of co-operation with actors and institutions outside Catalonia”, 
utilizing “numerous” CBC projects to shape the region’s “role in the emerging new political 
order in Europe” (Häkli 2002: 88).  The situation lent support to an MLG model of integration, 
as local and regional actors – empowered by competence granted to the regional Catalonian 
Autonomous Community government by the Spanish State – networked with multiple levels of 
administration to achieve their CBC ends.  The Interegió Catalunya, Languedoc-Roussillon, i 
Midi-Pyrénées CBR led numerous initiatives in the transportation, business, public services and 
higher-education sectors (ibid.: 81).  Nevertheless, Häkli’s findings suggest that even in such 
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fertile settings, the “existence of networks for cross-border co-operation will not necessarily lead 
to the erosion of political and cultural identities connected to the history of the modern nation-
state” (ibid.: 89).  In the case of Catalonia, weaker and less-prominent representation of Catalán 
language and culture in France, coupled with a demonstrated lack of knowledge of CBC 
activities by border residents, led Häkli to agree with other scholars that nationalist identities 
persist and national boundaries continue to act as “cultural and/or imaginary dividers” preventing 
further consolidation of a cross-border identity, and thus (presumably) a more integrated CBR 
society.   
This sentiment was echoed by Eder and Sandtner in their study of the Swiss-French-
German cooperation in the Regio TriRhena CBR, another “model region” due to its many years 
of CBC experience (2002: 141).  The region’s inhabitants, after overcoming “periods of severe 
breakdowns in communication during and after the two world wars” through renewed 
cooperation in the 1960s, are still divided by linguistic differences and conflicting views of local 
history (ibid.: 141-47).  Therefore, Eder and Sandtner conclude that “[e]ven in a region that can 
be seen as a single cultural area with a lot of common ground, the influence of some 150 years of 
nation-state dominance has left its mark” (2002: 157).  Paasi and Prokkola offer an explanation: 
“Nationalism manifests itself in various institutionalised forms, through which it becomes 
reproduced: in economic, cultural and social policy, defence policy and the army, border guard 
systems and nationally grounded education, for example” (2008: 16).  Through such means, 
borders are continually “emotionally” re-ified through “national flag days, military parades, 
national landscapes and other elements of national iconographies”, and even features as 
unsuspecting as border security surveillance technologies can “strengthen bordering in a society” 
and emphasize “social, cultural and political distinctions” (ibid.: 17).  Some authors are hopeful 
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that this may not be the case forever, though; as CBRs make gains in institutional and 
administrative structures of governance, there is still the possibility that nationalism may recede 
slightly in favor of CBR loyalty and interest, presumably leading to improved CBC and CBR 
integration (Bucken-Knapp 2003; cf. Kramsch and Dimitrova 2008).   
Often, the simple reality of economic differences across the border limits more prolific 
CBC, as in the case of German-French (Terlouw 2008), German-Polish (Kratke 1998), Spanish-
Portuguese (Pinheiro 2009) and Spanish-French (Harguindéguy and Bray 2009) cooperation.  
Divergent financial regulation, social security programs, educational systems, median wages, tax 
systems, housing prices, and decisionmaking conduits can all play a role in stalling cooperation 
(Terlouw 2008).  From a pragmatic standpoint, it is often easier for border residents to work with 
familiar administrative and business cultures instead of venturing into the unknown (Paasi and 
Prokkola 2008). 
 
3.6 Summary 
 
  Overall, scholarship reveals that CBC initiatives face more than purely territorial borders 
to overcome.  Collaborative endeavors face a variety of governance-related and socio-political 
obstacles to overcome, which interlock to prevent fulfillment of project and CBR objectives.  A 
“bottom-up” perspective exposes the contextual intricacies of cooperation from the eyes of CBC 
actors and border residents, giving empirical evidence to contribute to theoretical models of 
integration.  Both intergovernmentalist and MLG features appear as subnational governance 
structures struggle to operate without sufficient competence; research suggests that many CBC 
difficulties can be overcome if implementation and decisionmaking powers are “scaled down” 
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sufficiently towards the local level (Perkmann 2007).  Further complicating matters are the 
various societal issues posed by divergent and conflicting nationalist identities on each side of 
the border, which often impede efforts to consolidate a CBR identity that might be beneficial for 
enhanced cooperation.  Despite supranational efforts in the area of CBC, nationalism quietly 
persists in European government and society, impeding cooperation and integration across state 
lines.  If CBC represents the geographical “front lines” of integration between states, the 
conclusions of “border studies” research give a significant window into the challenges of that 
process.   
As can be seen in the review of literature, research of CBC at the border of Spain and 
Portugal is lacking – boasting only Pinheiro (2009) and Sidaway’s (2001) studies.  Thus, an 
investigation of cooperation across the Hispano-Luso border offers a needed perspective to fill in 
the geographical gaps in research.  Furthermore, research on the outspoken Hispano-Luso 
Eurocity projects, which claim to be the future of CBC, is presently nonexistent.  In the field of 
border studies, this lacuna must not be allowed to remain.  Exploration of these initiatives will 
give key insights into how traditional dividing lines are making the transition into foci of 
cooperation.  Such an endeavor not only contributes to the field of border studies, but to the 
broader picture of contemporary European integration.  All the more so, amidst talk of a “second 
generation” of cooperation, which Eurocity leaders claim symbolizes the birthplace of “New 
Europe” building “eurocitizens” (Mao, ed. 2008).  Now that they have been explored, the 
challenges experienced by other EU CBC projects help give insight into the context and 
objectives of Hispano-Luso Eurocity initiatives.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Research question 
 
This research project asks, Why do subnational actors at the Hispano-Luso border pursue 
the Eurocity projects; what is the primary objective of the actors leading the projects?  The 
findings of this study suggest that, although stated objectives are varied, local and regional 
officials pursue the Eurocity projects primarily as a means of economic gain for the implicated 
border municipalities.  Although local and regional officials make a host of claims related to 
improvements in governance and society, all goals ultimately point to a predominantly economic 
agenda.    
 
4.2 Main hypothesis and two alternative hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1, the main hypothesis, posits that local and regional actors pursue the 
Eurocity initiatives primarily to improve the economic welfare of the implicated border societies.   
The role of CBC initiatives in spurring economic development is a major theme in 
“border studies” scholarship.  Löfgren’s study of the Danish-Swedish “regionauts” notes that the 
cross-border Öresund bridge was seen as “a model for future economic as well as cultural 
integration within the European Union, and experiment in the new Europe without borders” 
(2008: 198).   Project participants sought to use the bridge for various economic ends in the 
housing, shopping, employment, trading , and private business sectors (ibid.: 202-203).  The 
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article also goes on to describe border officials playing with “the idea of a Eurocity as a market 
magnet” (ibid.: 203; emphasis mine).  Thus, the framing of a Eurocity initiative as a tool to 
improve the local economy does exist in the literature.  Löfgren also mentions other CBC 
projects in the area, claiming they largely have “the aim of putting the place on the national and 
European maps, and attracting business and tourism” (ibid.: 199).  Many other authors also refer 
to the significant economic objectives of CBC projects and cross-border regions (CBRs) (e.g., 
Lepik 2009, Prokkola 2011: 1195-96, Terlouw 2008).  Overall, border studies scholarship 
consistently discusses various CBC goals for bolstering economies; therefore, this may be the 
primary goal of the Hispano-Luso Eurocity initiatives.   
Two alternative hypotheses can be drawn from literature regarding contemporary cross-
border cooperation (CBC), in order to explain subnational actors’ pursuit of Eurocity projects.   
Hypothesis 2: Subnational actors use the Eurocity projects primarily to increase 
sovereignty and independence exercised in policy decisionmaking and implementation by 
subnational governance institutions.  
This hypothesis was chosen primarily because of its prevalence throughout “border 
studies” literature, as well as EU agendas for CBC.  As Perkmann (2007a) found in his research, 
the EU and its member states have sought to spread regional sovereignty in CBC away from the 
national and toward sub- and supranational levels of governance.  In this way, national 
institutions have a more direct route to the citizens affected by any particular policy, pushing 
degrees of control down to more localized governance structures for the sake of expediency in 
implementation and oversight (ibid.).  This decentralization of power (predicted by the MLG 
model) has been seen as a more “efficient” means of expressing more interests, conducting the 
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most “effective” CBC, and assuring the legitimacy of implemented policies (Harguindéguy and 
Bray 2009: 748; Perkmann 2007b).   
Moreover, the Spanish and Portuguese States are both outliers in terms of degrees of 
centralization.  The 1978 Spanish Constitution ceded a high degree of authority to Spain’s 
seventeen “Autonomous Communities” (Comunidades Autónomas), which sit one administrative 
level below the central state (Keating 2007: 22).  Spain is now highly decentralized: the national 
government devolves powers to the Autonomous Communities at unequal rates, with the 
“historic nations” (Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country) making the largest strides, 
partially as a result of strong regional parties (ibid.: 22-23).  The municipal government 
(composed of provinces) are not controlled by the Communities, but by the national government, 
making them less “superfluous” than in other regions (ibid.: 23).  On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, reflecting a more intergovernmentalist reality, “Portugal remains probably the most 
unitary and centralised of all EU member states”: power rests with the national government, 
while regions and districts enjoy “no meaningful autonomy” (Pinheiro 2009: 93).  While 
“regions lack the formal constitutional powers of those in Spain”, elected parish (freguesias) and 
municipal councils (Câmaras Municipais) do enjoy some minor autonomy (ibid.).  Thus, 
Portugal must rely on “the local level (municipal councils) to cooperate with the Spanish 
autonomous regional structures” on cross-border projects, creating an administrative imbalance 
which one scholar claims “hampers enormously the CBC process” in the border region 
(Medeiros 2010: 8).  Therefore, it is possible that subnational actors in Spain and Portugal use 
the Eurocity projects primarily to escape the cage of centralization and raise subnational 
autonomy in accordance with the MLG theory.   
A third explanation of officials’ objectives is also possible. 
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Hypothesis 3: Subnational actors primarily use the Eurocity projects to re-unite 
ethnic/submerged/stateless nations that were divided artificially by national boundary lines.  
In this scenario, actors seek principally to re-construct the border populace around 
“‘natural’ ethnic or spatial communities” in lieu of the “‘artificial’ and oppressive structures of 
the nation state” for the benefit of the society, which is one extreme of the a hypothetical 
“Europe of the Regions” scenario (Keating 1995: 10).  Explored most notably by Keating (1995) 
and Loughlin (1996), the “Europe of the Regions” paradigm arguably originated from the 
“‘integral’ federalist model of European integration” in which the nation-state is gradually 
“replaced by subnational levels of government and especially regions […] taking over some of 
the nation-state’s functions and responsibilities”, as “submerged ‘nations’” sought to “escape 
from the clutches of their ‘oppressive’ nation-states by becoming part of a wider European 
federation” (Loughlin 1996: 150).  Laughlin specifically notes that “[t]his strategy has become a 
reality in Belgium and partially in Spain”, especially in respect to the Basque movement in 
Northeast Spain and Southwest France (1996: 151).  Thus, the possibility exists that this so-
called “strategy” is also occurring in Northwest Spain (the site of the CVE and TVE), among the 
Galician people whose language (Galician) is so similar to their Portuguese neighbors.  
Moreover, the Europe of the Regions hypothesis and its related arguments are among the most 
disputed and discussed theoretical constructs in contemporary border studies literature and its 
predecessor, “regional studies”.     
 Finally, it should be noted that each competing hypotheses stresses that one particular 
objective is primary, not that there is solely one objective and the others are irrelevant. 
Therefore, while Hypothesis 1 states that economic gain is the primary objective, it also 
48 
 
concedes that the administrative re-structuring of Hypothesis 2 and the “submerged” nations of 
Hypothesis 3 may play a significant, but not central, role in managing the Eurocity projects.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
To discover evidence for possible primary objectives of the Eurocity projects, a content 
analysis was performed using secondary sources connected with the Eurocities.  This form of 
analysis was chosen because of the wealth of data available in the form of websites, official 
project documents, blog postings, press releases, and newspaper reports (on-line and in print) 
related to each Eurocity and covering their life-spans.  “Border studies” scholars almost always 
employ such methodology within their research (e.g. Busch 2003, Prokkola 2011).  Many efforts 
in the past have also employed interviews and/or surveys involving participating actors and 
affected border citizens as an additional means of data collection (e.g., Perkmann 2003).  
However, in the case of this project’s research question, such methods were considered 
advantageous, but ultimately unnecessary to reasonably address the alternative hypotheses.  
Stated objectives were present throughout the wide breadth of available data sources; interviews 
or surveys were thus considered unnecessary to aggregate goals.  Future studies in this area could 
utilize interviews and/or surveys to support or deny this project’s findings, possibly uncovering 
further objectives or expanding upon them with direct input from the actors themselves.  
Nevertheless, as this is the first and only research project investigating predominant objectives of 
subnational Eurocity actors at the Hispano-Luso border, its findings should stand as a “baseline” 
for future research. 
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Once collected, the data sources were scanned for statements made by participating 
subnational actors concerning the objectives of each projects.  These statements were all 
recorded.  To classify these recordings, the objectives were first combined into a table, 
displaying the specific Eurocity project and the bibliographic source.   The objectives of the 
actors were then sorted according to common themes that surfaced: “Societal rapprochement”, 
“EU funding”, and so on.  Each theme was subsequently given a number, called a “code”, to 
better organize the results (refer to Table 7.1 in Appendix).  
These coded themes were subsequently divided among three major categories – 
“economy”, “governance”, and “society” – according to their content.  Themes were categorized 
according to the primary object, or recipient, of the objective.  If the economy was the primary 
object, the theme fell under the “economy” category; if public administration or government 
were the object, the theme fell under the “governance” category; if the implicated residents were 
the object, the theme fell under the “society” category.  For example, “1-Economic 
development”, was classified among objectives for the local economy, while “4-Achieve 
common goals of administration” was placed in the category of governance objectives.  This 
resulted in the following table:  
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Table 4.1: Objectives for Eurocity projects 
Economy Governance Society 
CODE OBJECTIVE CODE OBJECTIVE CODE OBJECTIVE 
1 
Economic 
development 
4 
Achieve common 
goals of 
administration 
8 
Share public 
services 
2 
Improve 
tourism  
5 
Overcome 
administrative 
barriers (EGTC) 
9 
Foster 
“eurocitizens” 
3 
Attract EU 
funding 
6 “Make Europe” 10 
Societal 
rapprochement 
 7 
Increase visibility 
of municipality 
11 
Operationalize a 
de facto situation 
  12 Address daily life 
 
The various coded themes of objectives will be described in further detail below in the same 
order that they have been organized into the above table, after defining several key terms.  
Subsequent to the descriptions of the stated objectives, arguments will be made for their relative 
support of this project’s main hypothesis and two alternative hypotheses exploring subnational 
actors’ pursuit of the Eurocity projects.  
 
4.3.1 Definition of terms 
 
Moving forward, it is important to briefly define several terms.  For the purposes of this 
study, a typology of terms for public actors was created.  Within the scope of this research, 
governmental actors (or “leaders” or “officials”, used interchangeably) can belong to four 
different levels (in ascending order of distance from the citizen): local, regional, national, and 
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supranational.  A “local actor” is one whose scope of formal authority is contained within the 
municipal (city or township) level of governance; this could be a mayor, politician, or city 
councilman, for instance.  A “regional actor” is one whose scope of formal authority is contained 
within the regional level of governance (e.g., more than one municipality, but less than the entire 
State); this could be an official from one of Spain’s Autonomous Communities (such as Galicia), 
or a non-governmental actor working across more than one municipality (such as the Eixo) (cf. 
Perkmann 2003).  A “subnational” actor is either a local or regional actor, that is, an actor whose 
scope of formal authority is contained below the national level of governance.  A “national 
actor” is one whose scope of formal authority is contained within the national (central state) level 
of governance: heads of State and government, national ministers or Cabinet members, and so 
on.  A “supranational actor” is one whose scope of formal authority stretches further than the 
national level of governance, to the EU or “Community” level: members of EU Institutions (the 
European Commission, etc.), or members of supranational non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and interest groups, for example.  For the sake of conciseness, unless noted otherwise in 
the text, “actor”, “leader” or “official” stated alone will refer to a subnational actor.   
 
4.3.2 Summary of objectives 
 
 
Before testing the three alternative hypotheses, the collected data concerning subnational 
actors’ goals will be summarized.  The documents surrounding the Eurocity projects revealed 
three major categories of stated objectives for pursuing a Eurocity: improving the economy, 
governance, and society (refer to Table 4.1).   
 
4.3.2.1 Objectives for the economy 
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First, these projects strive for economic development, competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship, both within the cities proper and in the surrounding countryside 
(“Eurocidade”).  Press releases, reports and agendas report that subnational policymakers utilize 
the Eurocities to help make the local and regional economy more “dynamic” (Mao, ed. 2008: 
103).  This broad goal refers not only to diversifying local enterprises, but to specializing and 
strengthening pre-existing industries in order to foster economic development (ibid.).  Struggling 
in the wake of the current financial crisis, Eurocity leaders employ the projects to address a 
variety of perceived economic maladies, using the lowered barriers provided by the Single 
Market to their financial advantage (Cano 2011: 7, 9).  Eurocity leaders have growth objectives 
for multiple sectors of their economy, including human resources, private business, logistics, 
technology and healthcare (“Eurocidade”; “Feijóo salienta”; Cano 2011).  According to 
subnational actors, efforts work towards strengthening not only the municipalities, but the entire 
Euroregion (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 1).  By tightening together the two municipal economies into a 
unified, larger area, officials hope to become more competitive, attracting outside private 
investment in infrastructure and production (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 6; “Eurocidade”; Cano 2008a).   
As an example, a major focus for Elvas-Badajoz Eurocity (EBE) leaders is utilizing the project to 
make the border area more attractive as the potential future site of a Madrid – Lisbon high-speed 
rail train station (Cano 2007b).  Tui-Valença Eurocity (TVE) leaders hope to improve the rail 
line from Oporto, North Portugal to Vigo, Galicia (“La creación”).  EBE leaders seek to develop 
the alternative and clean energies sector, along with more sustainable agricultural practices to 
make Elvas and Badajoz a model for the green industry (Cano 2011: 9, 18).  Eurocity projects 
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also aim to increase the border population in the region, whose younger generation leaves the 
area to find employment in major cities (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 7; Mao, ed. 2008: 30). 
The cultural and heritage tourism industry is a frequent topic of conversation, as actors 
call for increased revitalization, preservation and restoration efforts on local rivers, natural parks, 
museums and other historically-important buildings in the area (“Eurocidade”; Cano 2011; 
Gonzáles 2012).  Eurocity officials seek to better advertise local historically-significant sites to 
tourists, such as Tui’s medieval cathedral or Valença’s 17th century fortified courtyards (“Feijóo 
ve”).  Objectives for the Chaves-Verín Eurocity (CVE), “The Eurocity of Water”, center on 
developing “health and wellness” tourism initiatives utilizing the mineral springs in the area 
("Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6; “Eurocidade”).  CVE leaders pinpoint the “Termal” industry, stressing 
the need to more effectively promote the area’s famous springs as a destination spot for health 
and spa tourism, making the Eurocity a European “reference point” for the industry (Mao, ed. 
2008: 8-9, 55).  A “Termal Research and Professional Tourism Training Institute”20 forms part of 
the CVE’s proposal, a strategy to create sustainability in the sector (“Dossier” Apr. 2008: 10).   
Meanwhile, Eurocity leaders openly state their determination to garner EU funds toward 
meeting these economic goals, hoping that the projects will direct Structural Funds toward their 
cities, increasingly so as the municipalities team together to create project proposals to present 
before the EU
 (“Feijóo salienta”; “La creación”). TVE actors, noting the success of the CVE 
project in garnering the last round of POCTEP financing from 2007-2013, have been “preparing” 
for the next round, set for 2013 – 2020 (“Feijóo salienta”).  When skeptics and opponents of 
Eurocity projects level charges against it, claiming that the projects are “merely a formula to 
capture European [financial] resources”21, leaders quickly reply that although EU funding is an 
                                                 
20
 “Instituto de Investigación e Formación Turístico Termal” (my translation)   
21
 “sólo es una fórmula para captar recursos europeos” (my translation) 
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important aspect of the project, the twinning of public services is more “the essence” of its 
operation
22
 (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 1, Oct. 2008: 4). 
 
4.3.2.2 Objectives for governance 
 
Officials also claim to utilize the Eurocity projects to reach objectives concerning local 
governance.  Leaders frequently emphasize that the projects have not been initiated due to the 
desires of a few individuals, but that Eurocities and the agendas they pursue reflect the will of 
actors throughout local, regional, and national government administration (Mao, ed. 2008: 23). 
In this way, subnational actors recognize the potential of the Eurocity to address common goals 
and interests shared between the two cross-border municipalities, some of which would be 
difficult or even impossible to reach alone (Mao, ed. 2008: 23).  Actors also believe that 
strengthening ties between cross-border administrative bodies will sustain Eurocity projects in 
the future, as present officials are replaced by their successors (Mao, ed. 2008: 16).  
Eurocity actors also seek to overcome the remaining “invisible” bureaucratic barriers to 
cross-border cooperation (CBC) posed by state boundaries, which hinder cross-border residents’ 
access to health, transportation, education and other public services (“Dossier” July 2008: 7).  As 
Eurocity leaders have looked at ways of overcoming these barriers, a common solution has 
emerged: form a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) for the project.  Created 
by the European Union in 2006, the EGTC instrument facilitates cross-border, transnational and 
inter-regional (region-region between non-bordering regions) cooperation between its members, 
via an agreement between EU member states, regional and local authorities, and judicial 
organisms within the EGTC’s boundaries (Mao, ed. 2008: 138).  While ultimately regulated by 
                                                 
22
 “Sharing public services” is a theme under the “society” category of objectives, explained further onwards.  
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the States, local and regional government institutions receive increasingly more competence over 
decisionmaking, legal and budgetary matters (ibid.: 138-139).  Eurocity actors find forming an 
EGTC particularly attractive, as it opens the door to developing the Eurocity’s own legal 
framework, and thus more prolific cooperation and integration informed by a local perspective 
(Cano 2011: 16, 19; Mao, ed. 2008:30).  The localized “legal personality” offered by the EGTC 
gives subnational public actors a mechanism towards “the elimination of legal, fiscal and 
administrative barriers, which penalize life in border areas”23: a forthright goal of the Eurocity 
projects (“Dossier” Feb. 2009: 5).  Eurocity officials can employ the EGTC to better govern the 
cross-border region, encouraging CBC programs, projects and proposals from a localized 
perspective (“Dossier” Aug. 2008: 1).  EGTC supporters also note that the mechanism is 
supported by EU law, emphasizing that it has primacy over national laws (Mao, ed. 2008: 140).  
Overall, Eurocity project leaders see great advantages in pursuing an EGTC as a means of 
diminishing governance-related barriers to cooperation.   
An interrelated goal for Eurocity projects is to “make Europe”, expressing and 
demonstrating a supranational vision matching the EU’s objectives for regions.  Subnational 
actors seek not only regional, but “European” development, believing that their projects are a 
physical demonstration of the EU’s philosophy of territorial organization (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 
1, 7-8).  Eurocities are also viewed as a strongly contributing to the EU-funded POCTEP’s 2008-
2013 objective of forging ties and relationships between border regions of Spain and Portugal 
(Cano 2008e).  Leaders believe that Eurocities are priorities for the EU’s CBC agenda, as they 
offer a more effective method of bypassing traditional administrative barriers than other regional 
or cross-border projects (“Dossier” Dec. 2008: 11).  Actors express the desire for the project to 
                                                 
23
 “la eliminación de las barreras legales, fiscales y administrativas, que penalizan la vida en las fronteras” (my 
translation) 
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play a unique, critical role in cross-border regions (CBRs)
24
 (Cano 2008c).  Chaves and Verín 
leaders want the CVE to be the “access point” to the Galicia-North Portugal Euroregion 
(“Dossier” Feb. 2008: 3; Mao, ed. 2008: 23).  Involved public actors communicate a high view 
of the Eurocity projects, claiming they “symbolize the construction of the ‘New Europe’ in a 
peripheral European corner”, and are in fact “the best way to make Europe” (“Dossier” July 
2008: 7, Feb. 2009: 5).  Actors refer to the Eurocities as “pioneering” and “highly innovative”, 
for the potential they offer both for bringing policy-making to a more local level, as well as 
deeper and more comprehensive forms of CBC throughout socio-cultural, economic, political 
and administrative arenas (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 1, May 2008: 2).   Not all subnational actors are 
supportive, and Verín in particular has political parties who warn against depending too much on 
the Eurocity project, by counting on it to solve all local problems and ignoring the other “grave” 
urban, industrial and tourism problems within the region; some opposing party members have 
even labeled the initiative political “propaganda” ("Dossier" Sept. 2008: 15, Feb. 2009: 7, Mar. 
2010: 3; Mao, ed. 2008: 45).   
A final governance-related theme drawn from Eurocity publicity is “visibility”, both for 
the project and for the CBR.  Eurocity leaders stress the importance of these projects in “putting 
their cities on the European map”: a Eurocity is an opportunity to “gain presence and centrality 
in Europe” (“Dossier” Apr. 2008: 15; “Feijóo salienta”).  One EBE visionary speaks of the 
potential Eurocity as the future “center” or “capital” of a “re-emergent” “Southwest Iberia”, 
attracting investments and residents, generating trade, economic development, and scientific 
research in the region (Cano 2011: 15).  CVE leaders stress that the projects carried out through 
                                                 
24
 For a discussion of CBRs and euroregions, please see the “Background” chapter. 
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the Eurocity “‘can situate’ the Galicia-North Portugal Euroregion ‘on the level that it rightfully 
deserves’”25 (“Dossier” Feb. 2008: 3; Mao, ed. 2008: 23).   
These aspirations play out in networking actions taken by Eurocity officials, who have 
hosted cohorts of EU diplomats and interacted with supranational organizations and other 
Eurocities, allegedly in the interest of finding ways to overcome governance-related barriers 
(“Dossier” Oct. 2008: 1, 8, Dec. 2008: 11).  TVE leaders have traveled directly to Brussels to 
present their project to the European Commission and Committee of the Regions (“La 
eurociudad”). CVE leaders have pursued supranational visibility through presenting the project 
at events such as “Open Days”, jointly organized by the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) 
of Regional Policy and the Committee of the Regions (another EU institution), and exchanges 
and conferences organized by the “Cross-border Operational Mission” (MOT: Misión 
Operacional Transfronteriza), an organization spanning several European states (“Dossier” May 
2008: 3, Oct. 2008: 9, Nov. 2008: 15, Mar. 2009: 15).   
 
4.3.2.3 Objectives for the society  
 
Thirdly, Eurocity leaders state objectives to improve societal conditions in the border 
region.  In the realm of society, municipalities seek to share public services, in areas such as 
sanitation, education, health, emergency services, and even local pools, libraries and theaters 
(“Dossier” July 2008: 31, Jan. 2009: 43; Cano 2011: 11; “La creación”).  This sharing of public 
services is meant to promote a more integrated system and avoid duplication; resources can be 
pooled to avoid redundancy in services offered to residents (“Eurocidade”; Gonzáles 2012).  
                                                 
25
 “os projectos em curso ‘podem situar’ esta euro-região ‘ao nivel que por direito lhe corresponde’” (my 
translation.   
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Officials seek ways to make it easier for Eurocity residents to work, study, receive medical 
treatment and spend leisure time on the other side of the border (ibid.).  Eurocity students will 
have the opportunity to take classes in universities just across the border, benefitting from 
programs or practicums not offered within their city (Cano 2011: 24).  A policy of “positive 
discrimination” favoring the cross-border city residents, consumers and administration is 
strongly encouraged (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 7; Cano 2011: 24).  As the towns continue to merge 
economically and administratively, leaders hope that more possibilities will arise to coordinate 
and share services (“Feijóo ve”).  An ultimate goal is establishing a so-called “free trade zone” 
(zona franca social), in which Eurocity residents have universal and equal access to joint public 
services (Mao, ed. 2008: 46).   
Another major intention shared between the three Eurocity projects is to foster 
“eurocitizens” (Mao, ed. 2008; Cano 2011; Gonzáles 2012).  Subnational officials believe their 
projects will reveal what it truly means to become a “European citizen” (“Dossier” Feb. 2009: 5).  
Leaders of the Eurocity projects use the two terms regularly when referring to the implicated 
city’s residents, and discuss creating “Eurocitizen Cards” to allow residents to more easily access 
services across the border (Gonzáles 2012).  The idea of eurocitizenry is in fact strongly tied to 
shared public services and its apex, the “free trade zone” (zona franca social; described 
previously), as Eurocity actors hope that such an environment will nurture deeper integration of 
residents.  In this way, leaders see the Eurocity projects as “citizen construction laborator[ies]”26 
or “European laborator[ies] of new citizens”27 (Mao, ed. 2008: 13, 24).  Eurocities thus should 
go beyond merely cross-border institutional cooperation or joint creation of infrastructures: these 
projects exemplify the “second generation” of CBC, in which residents take on a eurocitizen 
                                                 
26
 “verdadeiros laboratorios de construcíon de cidadanía” (my translation) 
27
 “‘laboratorio europeo de novas cidadanías’: a zona franca social” (my translation) 
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identity and integrate more fully with the cross-border society and economy (Mao, ed. 2008: 13, 
45).  The term has to do with the daily lives of the inhabitants: eurocitizenry cannot be imposed 
from the top-down by treaties “at the highest levels” of the political decisionmaking process, but 
must come as the Eurocity residents themselves begin to see the practical advantages of cross-
border cooperation in the areas of education, public services and the local business community, 
among other sectors (“Eurocidade”; Mao, ed. 2008)28.  Joint sporting and culturally-based events 
also seek this end (Cano 2011: 24).  Eurocity leaders also frequently describe the importance of 
strongly encouraging bilingualism within the Spanish-Portuguese Eurocities, developing a “new 
bilingual generation of eurocitizens” by “overlapping” residents in terms of both language and 
culture through education from youth into adulthood (Cano 2011: 15, 25).   
Especially in CVE and TVE publicity, Eurocity officials stress the importance of societal 
rapprochement: their cities will be “two neighborhoods of the same city” or “two towns” that 
will merge into one (Mao, ed. 2008: 64, 95).  Actors seek to strengthen relations between the 
cross-border city residents and unite them over the project’s initiatives (Mao, ed. 2008: 7-8).  
Eurocity leaders stress the importance of tying together their academic and scientific 
communities, encouraging interaction with colleagues across the border (Gonzáles 2012).  
Overall, the Eurocities can help create a better internal understanding between Portugal and 
Spain, so that the two might in turn project a better outward image (Cano 2011: 15).  Cultural, 
educational and linguistic exchange events and programs all serve to promote rapprochement 
between border residents (“Dossier” Jan. 2009: 23).   
In this way, Eurocity leaders desire to take advantage of the de facto situation that they 
claim is already functioning in the border municipalities.  Actors seek to “operationalize” present 
                                                 
28
 “A cidadania europeia não se impõe por tratados concertados ao mais alto nível, mas constrói-se no dia-a-dia da 
vida dos cidadãos” (my translation) 
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and historical social, cultural and linguistic relationships already shared between border 
residents, emphasizing similarities in order that citizens might further integrate and reap social 
benefits made possible by the Eurocity’s efforts (Cano 2011: 7; Mao, ed. 2008: 46).  Thus, rather 
than an artificially-imposed, top-down political project, actors emphasize that the Eurocity is 
simply “a recognition of a reality that already exists, but that can be deepened”29 (“Dossier” Oct. 
2008: 7).  Eurocity officials insist that their project “is working around a reality that is 
sociologically-perceived more clearly by residents than in the political, administrative and 
political spheres in charge of the project’s development”30 (Mao, ed. 2008: 47; “Dossier” Dec. 
2008: 11).  These actors regularly stress the “fictitiousness” of the current Spanish-Portuguese 
border in their region, claiming that the boundary line was created for purely political reasons
31
, 
rather than reflecting the socio-cultural reality of border residents, who allegedly have more in 
common with their cross-border neighbors than with their fellow citizens in other parts of the 
state (“Dossier” Apr. 2008: 20, Dec. 2008: 2).  Eurocity officials cite not only geographical 
proximity, but present cross-border shopping, residence, institutional projects, use of public 
sanitary and medical services, cultural and sporting events, and the cross-border celebration of 
national holidays as evidence for a de facto situation that simply needs to be converted to de juri 
(Cano 2011: 14, 17-18; Mao, ed. 2008: 21-22, 48).   
Eurocity officials frequently emphasize the desire to improve overall the daily life of 
border residents as the central objective for the projects.  Actors challenge any claims that they 
are merely short-term politically- or economically-minded projects distant from local day-to-day 
needs (“Dossier” Oct. 2008: 4, Jan. 2008: 7).  They emphasize that Eurocities address economic 
                                                 
29
 "é o reconhecimento de uma realidade que já existe, mas que pode ser aprofundada" (my translation)   
30
 “‘Estamos a traballar sobre unha realidade que sociolóxicamente é percibida de forma máis clara polos veciños 
que no ámbito político, administrativo e xurídico que se emprega para desenvolver o proxecto’" (my translation)   
31
 The border was formed in 1297 by the Alcañices Treaty (refer to section 2.3 of the “Background” chapter).   
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and social weaknesses in a unique, comprehensive way for border residents, even more so as an 
EGTC (a “governance” objective): the projects reduce economic, legal and administrative 
barriers, make the local economy more dynamic, consolidate a common living and working 
space, and promote the joint management and consumption of resources (“Dossier” Oct. 2008: 4, 
Feb. 2009: 5; Mao, ed. 2008: 22).   
 
4.4 Analysis of data  
 
 Based on the above data, this research concludes that Hypothesis 1, the main hypothesis, 
is confirmed.   Subnational actors pursue the Eurocity projects primarily to improve the 
economic welfare of the participating municipalities; objectives for the local economy, 
governance, and society ultimately serve this central interest.  There appears to be insufficient 
evidence that supports the alternative hypotheses, that subnational actors use the Eurocity 
projects primarily to increase sovereignty and independence exercised in policy decisionmaking 
and implementation by subnational governance institutions (Hypothesis 2), or that subnational 
actors primarily use the Eurocity projects to re-unite ethnic/submerged/stateless nations that 
were divided artificially by national boundary lines (Hypothesis 3).  In the end, Eurocity 
objectives point overall to actors being driven principally to improve the economies of the 
implicated municipalities.  In order to examine this in depth, the following analysis will discuss 
each category of objectives in turn: those concerning the economy, governance and society (refer 
to Table 4.1).    
 
4.4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1 
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The “economy” category of objectives contains three common themes: economic 
development, the tourism sector, and attracting EU funding (refer to Table 4.1).  These appear to 
point fairly directly to a chiefly economic agenda: subnational officials desire a more dynamic, 
competitive, entrepreneurial local economy to attract outside investment, utilizing the Eurocity 
projects to achieve fiscal objectives.  EBE actors, for example, have pinpointed the alternative 
and clean energies sector as a potential for significant growth.  The tourism sector appears to 
have the most unreached potential in the eyes of many subnational Eurocity officials, who use 
the project to attract more visitors – and thus more money – to the area.  The CVE has even re-
branded itself as the “Eurocity of Water”, seizing the opportunity to use the project to raise its 
visibility as a “European” tourist destination.  In order to sustain the projects into the future, 
Eurocity officials stress time and again the critical need to direct EU funding to the border area.  
Subnational actors apparently hope these Eurocity projects will increase the visibility of the 
involved municipalities to EU institutions, specifically those in charge of Structural Fund 
distribution – a point that will be elaborated upon in the following analysis of objectives for 
governance and society.   
 
4.4.2 Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
 As they directly concern aspects of administration by subnational institutions, objectives 
for governance should have the greatest possibility to support Hypothesis 2.  However, these 
goals appear to be ultimately economically-focused as well, in line with Hypothesis 1.   
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First, the most prevalent “common goals” shared by participating municipality 
administrations are joint construction projects on transportation infrastructure (such as EBE’s 
cross-border high-speed rail train station, or the Badajoz airport remodel), and increasing the 
presentation of joint projects to the EU, for funding purposes.  In this light, Eurocity supporters 
remind others of past and current CBC initiatives between the participating cross-border cities 
and within the Galicia-North Portugal Euroregion – including joint participation in national 
expositions, sporting and cultural events – as rationale for further cooperation (“Dossier” May 
2008: 1; “O vindeiro”).  Some of these projects have been funded through the EU’s Interreg 
program, providing financial incentives for further collaboration (Mao, ed. 2008: 22).  The 
present existence of regional-level CBC structures – such as the Eixo Atlántico, Galicia-North 
Portugal Working Community (Comunidade de Traballo Galicia-Norte de Portugal) and 
Támega Territorial Cooperation Community (Comunidade Territorial de Cooperación do 
Támega) surrounding the CVE – are emphasized as well (Mao, ed. 2008: 31).  There is no 
evidence here that subnational actors employ the Eurocity projects in order to increase 
policymaking competence of subnational governance institutions, in accordance with Hypothesis 
2.  Rather, Eurocity officials seem to be mostly concerned with joint project management and 
collaborating aimed at attracting supranational funds: local administrations band together for 
economic ends, supporting Hypothesis 1.   
In the same way, the Eurocity project leaders’ pursuit of “making Europe” through 
playing a unique, “pioneering” role in CBRs does not lend ample support to Hypothesis 2.  
Subnational actors expressly desire that these projects are viewed as living examples of the EU’s 
philosophy of territorial organization.  This would possibly support Hypothesis 2, as subnational 
actors may utilize projects to shape the execution of public affairs around the EU’s ideals.  
64 
 
Indeed, CVE leaders mention the fact that the initiative is pioneering in that it moves 
policymaking closer to the citizen, which lends support to Hypothesis 2 (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 1).  
However, actors also specifically underline their belief that the Eurocity projects, due to their 
potential to more easily cross bureaucratic barriers than other CBC projects, are priorities for the 
EU’s CBC operations.  This suggests that subnational actors are more concerned with being 
noticed by the EU than strengthening local sovereignty with supranational favor.  Therefore, the 
more “unique” and “pioneering” the Eurocity project, the more visibility it will have on the EU’s 
radar, and the more attention it is likely to receive via the EU’s CBC instruments, and the 
Structural Funds that these entities parse out.  
CVE leaders’ pursuit of visibility through presenting the project before the Commission’s 
DG Regional Policy, the Committee of the Regions and MOT (who hosted the officials in 
Strasbourg) appears to be simply a means of assuring that EU funding flows to the project (cf. 
“Dossier” Nov. 2008: 15).  So far, no evidence exists that this visibility translates to increased 
subnational decisionmaking powers.  Rather, visibility is increased to attract tourists and public 
and private investments, objectives within the “economy” category in line with Hypothesis 1 (cf. 
"Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6).   
One challenge to Hypothesis 1 is that MOT also hosted CVE officials in the 2009 “Cross-
border Agglomerations: Potentiating internal governance”32 conference, which brought together 
Eurocity-like projects from several other European border areas (“Dossier” Mar. 2009: 15).  
Such a meeting appears to most readily support Hypothesis 2, as the topic of the conference was 
improving the involved border governments’ execution of public affairs, by overcoming legal 
barriers to cooperation and networking with similar projects across Europe (ibid.).  However, the 
term “public affairs”, in the case of Hispano-Luso Eurocities, refers to the sharing of public 
                                                 
32
 “Aglomerações Transfronteiriças: Podenciação da governação interna” (my translation) 
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services (a theme in the “society” category) in practice, not to the cross-border integration of 
public institutions or decisionmaking structures.  As will be further argued in the following 
analysis, this objective actually reflects the validity of Hypothesis 1, in that municipalities claim 
to share services primarily as a way to cut costs by avoiding duplication.  Evidence does not 
suggest that the sharing of services is at all related to a desire to increase subnational sovereignty 
or independence exercised in localized policy decisionmaking and implementation.  Thus, in the 
end, “making Europe”, “pioneering”, and increasing the visibility of Eurocity projects seem most 
likely to be employed to improve the welfare of the border economy.     
Perhaps the most interesting feature that might be used to support Hypothesis 2 is the 
Eurocity officials’ candid pursuit of the EGTC mechanism, described in the above summary of 
data.  The EGTC, designed by the EU to facilitate CBC by directing competence to local and 
regional governments, allures Eurocity actors for its potential to breach legal and bureaucratic 
barriers to cooperation.  This would be directly consistent with Hypothesis 2, and other authors’ 
assertions that national and supranational actors pursue expediency in policy implementation and 
oversight via decentralizing sovereignty in some policy areas to more localized governance 
structures (cf. Perkmann 2007a).  However, in the eyes of subnational Eurocity actors, increasing 
competence does not seem to be the main focus of the projects.  The EGTC mechanism appears 
to be seen more as a tool to raise supranational visibility than anything else, which (as argued in 
the preceding paragraph) verifies Hypothesis 1 rather than 2.  As an example, Eurocity officials 
specifically cite desiring to create an EGTC due to the likelihood that the EU will privilege 
future funding to projects using this EU-created mechanism (Mao, ed. 2008: 140).  Additionally, 
the legal and bureaucratic barriers which actors look to use the EGTC to surpass are specifically 
those hindering the cross-border sharing of public services (a theme in the “society” category).  
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This objective is consistent with a Hypothesis 1 more than anything else, as sharing of services 
translates to lowered costs for the municipal administrations.  Thus, while in and of itself the 
pursuit of an EGTC appears to support Hypothesis 2, context suggests that increased local 
competence may be more of a side benefit than a central ambition of the Eurocity projects. 
 
4.4.3 Testing Hypothesis 3  
 
Objectives for society generally maintain Hypothesis 1 rather than 3.  Subnational actors 
utilize the Eurocity projects to share public services in order to pool resources and avoid 
duplicating services, lowering costs to residents and institutions.  Evidence does not suggest that 
this feature will be used to further any broader goal of uniting a “submerged” people.  Eurocity 
leaders also stress the importance of integrating the two societies through the project as a central 
societal goal (i.e., “societal rapprochement”).  Without the appropriate context, this could appear 
to potentially support Hypothesis 3, as it is concerned with the re-integration of a separated 
people.  However, what subnational actors apparently mean by this integration is mostly 
concerned with the cross-border sharing of public services between residents.  There is no broad 
substantive evidence that subnational actors desire to reunite a “stateless” nation, inasmuch as 
the integration focuses mainly around that of public services on each side of the border.  The two 
municipalities are thusly to become “two neighborhoods of the same city”; officials use terms 
such as “social cohesion” to describe border citizens’ transcendence of national boundary lines 
and coalescence into a single society (“Dossier” Jan. 2008: 1; Mao, ed. 2008: 95).   
Moreover, subnational actors lean heavily towards the creation of an EGTC (a 
“governance” objective) to increase the likelihood of societal rapprochement.  Actors explicitly 
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discuss employing the EGTC and societal integration as a means of promoting further CBC 
programs, projects and proposals.  Thus, although actors seek cross-border societal integration, 
evidence suggests that they are primarily concerned with shared services and drafting a potential 
EGTC, goals which maintain Hypothesis 1. 
In the same way, the goals of fostering “eurocitizens” or “European citizens” in the 
municipal societies lend support to Hypothesis 1 over 3.  At first read, these terms may conjure 
up visions of a transformed society, perhaps bearing out Hypothesis 3.  However, the reality 
seems to be far more mundane.  Subnational actors utilize these terms to spur societal integration 
which, in the case of the Eurocity projects, is mostly concerned with the sharing of public 
services between residents on both sides of the border.  The sharing of services ultimately 
maintains Hypothesis 1 in its focus on saving money by reducing duplicated efforts, as 
previously discussed.  This can be seen clearly in the TVE leaders’ idea of creating “Eurocitizen 
Cards” to allow residents to more easily access services, not only public ones but those offered 
by private businesses, which betrays an explicitly economic agenda.  Actors’ push to “valorize” 
oral, literary, musical and plastic art cultural traditions in the CVE region forms part of the 
“Eurocitizen” objective as well.  Although CVE officials put forth several goals designed to 
foster artistic creativity within the two municipalities, they are also mentioned alongside a 
proposed “biannual economic and productivity festival” (festival biannual da criatividade 
económica e produtiva) and designing and implementing training programs to cultivate business 
creativity (Mao, ed. 2008: 66, 68).  Thus, evidence suggests that “Eurocitizenry” also supports 
Hypothesis 1.   
Subnational actors claim that the projects aim to become so-called “European 
laboratories of new citizens” representing the “second generation” of CBC, having a much 
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deeper effect on the daily lives of border residents that other types of cooperation projects.  
However, once mentioning these visions, actors go on to specifically describe the practical 
advantages vis-à-vis sharing public services and investing in the local business community.  
Thus, the terms “eurocitizen”, “European citizen”, “European laboratories of new citizens”, and 
“second generation” are tied more to economic benefits than socio-cultural re-integration, and 
likely employed simply to raise visibility of the project in the eyes the EU, which – as discussed 
previously – supports Hypothesis 1.  Even the EBE’s vision of a re-emergent “Southwest Iberia” 
has mainly to do with attracting residents and investments, generating commerce, industry and 
tourism (Cano 2011: 15).  Therefore, the usage of these terms cannot be reasonably harnessed to 
maintain Hypothesis 3, in which actors wish to re-unite a “submerged” people divided artificially 
by national boundary lines.  In the end, data suggests that subnational officials’ use of bold 
rhetoric serves mostly to further an economic agenda.   
One of the stronger Eurocity features that might be used to advocate Hypothesis 3 is the 
heavy emphasis on developing bilingualism and “overlapping” residents in terms of both 
language and culture throughout their lifetimes (Cano 2012: 15, 25).  Subnational actors create 
numerous cultural, educational and linguistic cross-border exchanges to promote such 
rapprochement between the two societies.  While it may not be as extreme as a “Europe of the 
Regions” scenario, this is an obvious step toward uniting two peoples beyond the level of sharing 
public services, and officials appear to be aspiring “cultural entrepreneurs” (cf. Bucken-Knapp 
2003).  This objective does appear to be directly tied to the integration of the border societies, 
which (as previously discussed) supports Hypothesis 1, in that Eurocity officials are so heavily 
focused on sharing public services to cut costs.  In this particular case, evidence cannot prove 
that Hypothesis 3 is entirely invalid.  However, in the case of Hispano-Luso Eurocities, budding 
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cultural entrepreneurship does not necessarily translate into a search to reunite a submerged 
nation, either.     
 The final societal objective that subnational actors claim is to “operationalize” the de 
facto situation they claim is currently functioning within their municipalities.  This goal appears 
at first to contain strong evidence for Hypothesis 3, as Eurocity leaders describe the current and 
historical sociological, cultural and linguistic relations shared across borders, and the irrelevance 
of current boundary lines in artificially dividing a common people (cf. Bucken-Knapp 2003).  
Nevertheless, data suggests that even this objective supports Hypothesis 1 over 3.  By 
“operationalize”, Eurocity actors mean that the project will use the societies’ shared heritage 
markers to attract tourism and influence residents toward further societal integration (e.g., 
sharing public services), that they might enjoy the benefits provided by the project.  There 
appears to be little evidence for anything beyond this economic agenda.  One might argue that 
the “operationalization” of the present situation merely acts as a cover for a deeper desire to unite 
a common people, in support of Hypothesis 3.  This cannot be proven inaccurate by this study’s 
data, and may require interviews to draw out supporting evidence.  Overall, evidence implies that 
subnational officials list all of the de facto cross-border ways the society already operates – 
present retail, residence, institutional projects, use of public services, cultural and sporting 
events, etc. – simply to encourage residential participation in the Eurocity project, which can be 
the means by which the situation can pass to de juri, bringing further gains to the local economy 
in each of these areas.   
 
4.5 Conclusion  
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 Overall, this analysis confirms Hypothesis 1 as most valid, that subnational actors at the 
Hispano-Luso border primarily utilize the Eurocity projects for economic gain.  Some evidence 
does partially support Hypotheses 2 and 3; however, this research suggests that these aspirations 
at most play a secondary role in the process.  Although such desires may compose part of 
officials’ thinking, they do not appear to be central in light of Eurocity objectives.  The small 
portions of data that hint at Hypothesis 2 do not lend much support to the claim that Eurocity 
actors mainly utilize the projects to increase subnational decisionmaking sovereignty.  Nor does 
sufficient data exist to strongly confirm Hypothesis 3, that actors are primarily seeking to re-
unite “artificially-divided” peoples via the Eurocities.  Rather, objectives for the economy, 
governance and society all point a situation in which subnational actors employ the projects 
chiefly as a means of economic gain for the participating border municipalities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
 Although multiple possibilities exist explaining objectives of subnational actors pursuing 
the unique “Eurocity” cross-border cooperation (CBC) projects at the Hispano-Luso border, this 
research concludes that Eurocity leaders principally use the projects to improve the economic 
welfare of the implicated municipalities (Hypothesis 1).  Data suggests that agendas seeking 
reinforced subnational institutional competence (Hypothesis 2) or re-uniting a “submerged” 
people (Hypothesis 3) through the projects are not primary, but secondary factors at best.  A 
content analysis of secondary sources concerning the “Chaves-Verín Eurocity” (CVE), “Tui-
Valença Eurocity” (TVE), and potential “Elvas-Badajoz Eurocity” (EBE) reveals overall support 
that local and regional actors are mostly concerned with improving the economies of the 
implicated municipalities.   
 Such a conclusion makes sense given the context of present Hispano-Luso CBC.  As 
explained in the “Background” chapter, the primary objective of the Cohesion Policy, by which 
the European Union (EU) distributes Structural Funds to support CBC among its member states, 
is to develop struggling economies within national border regions (Goulet, ed. 4-6).  These 
resources fund the “Operational Programme for Spain-Portugal Cross-border Cooperation: 2007-
2013” (POCTEP), which presently supports the majority of the CVE project, while TVE and 
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EBE leaders seek its assistance. On the geographic and economic fringes of their respective 
nation-states, subnational project leaders may be less concerned with gaining more institutional 
authority or unifying a people with similar identities, than with creating jobs and attracting 
investment to a struggling region.   
 
5.2 Contributions to relevant scholarship 
 
This study addresses significant geographical and scalar gaps in border studies 
scholarship.  Containing the oldest standing and (for a period) longest internal EU border, the 
region separating Spain and Portugal must not continue to be ignored.  Sidaway’s (2001) and 
Pinheiro’s (2009) studies are necessary, but insufficient to understand this historic border area in 
terms of its economic, institutional and social dynamics.  Additionally, “border studies” scholars 
laud the movement towards a “grassroots” or “bottom-up” research perspective, inviting local 
residents to comment on borders and CBC rather than only institutional actors (cf. Häkli and 
Kaplan 2002: 13).  Nevertheless, authors have also primarily conducted their research on the 
scale of the cross-border region (CBR), while neglecting the individual CBC projects within 
them.  In a research field where local context has such a measurable effect on results, drawing 
accurate conclusions on such a broad geographical scale may not be possible (cf. Sidaway 2001).  
Moving research down to the project level, as this study has done, allows for more precise and 
supportable conclusions.  When making such a shift, one must remember that broader 
implications drawn from a single study will be less possible, as the specific context (e.g., 
geographic location, job market, subnational actors, project nature) will not be the same for most 
other locales, both within the same border region and without (cf. Häkli and Kaplan 2002: 13).  
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Overall, in order for a more complete and nuanced “grassroots” perspective, scholars should 
balance the investigation of CBC at both the CBR and project level.    
 Beyond addressing gaps in border studies scholarship, this research contributes empirical 
evidence to relevant theories.  First, by inquiring into the motivations of collaboration from the 
geographical “front lines” of integration, this study has implications for the theory of multi-level 
governance (MLG).  Although no definitive evidence exists to suggest that subnational 
governance actors are deliberately using the Eurocities to gain decisionmaking competence from 
national institutions (in accordance with Hypothesis 2), local leaders’ interest in establishing a 
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) to more effectively manage the project is 
an especially interesting finding.  The legal benefits offered by this mechanism, while ultimately 
regulated by the central state, give local and regional structures greater freedom to govern their 
territories, lending support to MLG’s claim that national “decision-making competencies” 
diminish in favor of sub- and supranational (Marks et. al.: 346).  Furthermore, subnational actors 
appear to be moving “vertically” up to the supranational arena, exampled by the CVE’s 
interactions at the “Open Days” forum hosted by the EU (“Dossier” May 2008: 3).  This suggests 
that political arenas for Hispano-Luso Eurocity actors may be “interconnected” rather than 
“nested”, consistent with Marks et al.’s claims.  This seems to be a reliable finding, as Marks’ 
study of Structural Funds (which support the CVE) were the basis for the assertions of the MLG 
paradigm (Pollack 2010: 36).   
Additionally, this study advocates the “new regionalist” perspective, whose scholars 
attempt to “move beyond state-centric assumptions” when researching integration and 
cooperation, in support of the MLG model (Söderbaum 2003: 7).  The “romantics” who foresee a 
“Europe of the regions” (EoR) of “‘natural’ ethnic or spatial communities” may be slightly 
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disappointed by the conclusions of this project’s analysis, as Hypothesis 3 was mostly refuted 
(Keating 1995: 10).  However, especially in light of subnational actors’ interest in forming a 
EGTC, national authority may be slowly eroding from below, supporting a less “utopian” 
version of a EoR in line with the MLG model (ibid.: 10-19).    
In retrospect, the study’s conclusions could have benefitted from the aid of targeted 
interview questions with implicated subnational actors.  Such a process could be a worthwhile 
addition to the methodology, addressing actors’ agendas behind Eurocity projects.  Moreover, 
interviewing implicated border residents could possibly contribute to an even more nuanced 
understanding of actors’ objectives, challenges and motivations by adding a different 
perspective.  Future studies on this subject could benefit from these methodological additions.   
As can be seen, this current project examining objectives for cooperation at the Hispano-
Luso border should be seen as a “baseline” for future research.  It expands the research agenda of 
current “border studies” scholarship, going beyond simply asking what effects borders have on 
the daily lives of its inhabitants.  Eurocities and other CBC projects help determine the 
implicated residents’ financial wellbeing, social situations, and public service rendered: all vital 
aspects of day-to-day living.  Examining and assessing objectives can thus be a new outlet for 
scholars, adding a valuable perspective to the study of CBRs and CBC.   
 
5.3 Future research 
 
 This study’s results also raise several important questions.  Most obviously, in the light 
of the economic agendas pursued by the Eurocity initiatives, what effects will the current 
European financial and sovereign debt crises have on these projects?  Future research should 
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trans-temporally examine the effects of the current financial crisis on Hispano-Luso CBC, 
measuring effects on not only these, but other initiatives.  In the midst of enduring recessions and 
high unemployment (hovering around 24% in Spain), both countries face tough austerity 
measures to reduce deficits via raised taxes and cuts to public salaries, budgets and services 
(Hewitt 2012a, 2012b; Minder 2011).  The Spanish foreign office’s budget has been cut in half, 
“[i]ndustry, energy and tourism will get a 32% cut, while the public works budget will be slashed 
by 34%” (“Spain budget”).  These are all central sectors for each pair of Eurocity municipalities, 
along with many other contemporary Hispano-Luso CBC endeavors.  How will subnational, 
national and supranational actors react to austerity measures, and how will the changes affect the 
scope and depth of cross-border integration?  As explained in the “Background” chapter, the 
border area between Spain and Portugal already suffers from significant demographic and 
economic challenges; the involved Eurocity municipalities are certainly no exception
33
.  The 
financial crisis and austerity measures may have grave effects in the already disadvantaged 
border region. 
Additionally, should austerity stretch upwards to the EU itself, the consequences for 
Structural Funds which support CBC are still unknown.  If Eurocity projects lose the potential 
for supranational funding, how will their driving actors respond?  Adequately answering these 
questions will require time for the current economic situation to run its course.  Eurocity leaders 
are already aware of the possibility that Structural Funds may be re-directed away from the 
Hispano-Luso border region in the future, and the region of Galicia has already been de-
prioritized as a recipient of the Funds due to an increase in average income of its residents 
(Europa Press 2012).  As shown in the Methodology chapter, acquiring supranational funding 
was a major objective of Eurocity projects – if these resources are moved towards poorer Eastern 
                                                 
33
 Refer to sections 2.3 and 2.5.1 in the “Background” chapter. 
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European member states in future funding periods, or simply withdrawn, what consequences will 
these and other CBC initiatives at the Hispano-Luso border face?  A trans-temporal study is 
needed to address the sustainability of these projects under shifting financial conditions.   
In wealthier, more economically-dynamic CBRs such as the Basque country or 
Catalunya, predominant objectives for CBC may be quite different.  These two regions along the 
border of Spain and France would be very interesting locales with which to test this project’s 
hypotheses, especially on Eurocity-like initiatives.  With a robust economy already in place, 
distinct common languages shared among residents, the outspoken separatist notions of some of 
the local and regional leaders, and France’s rigidly-centralized government34, what are the 
principal goals for CBC projects along this border?  Are actors using these initiatives for more 
than they claim in the official objectives of these projects?  Governance (Hypothesis 2) and 
socio-cultural (Hypothesis 3) agendas may well be substantially more salient among these 
subnational CBC actors, marking an interesting contrast with the present study.   
 In the interest of cultivating a deeper understanding of Eurocity projects and their 
implications for European CBC and integration, future studies might ask, Which actors primarily 
drive further integration of Eurocity residents?  It was clear from the data that although 
subnational institutional actors were heavily involved in establishing the economic, 
administrative and social parameters of the projects, the local workforce and business owners 
played an integral role (“Dossier” Feb. 2009: 1).  At its core, the deep integration subnational 
actors are pursuing through Eurocities will be a matter of border residents turning policy into 
reality.  In this sense, future scholarship should investigate Eurocity residents’ reactions to the 
projects, and what effects these initiatives actually have on their daily lives (cf. Häkli and Kaplan 
2002: 13; Newman 2006: 143).  Are Eurocity residents “catching on”: do the projects’ measures 
                                                 
34
 Refer to “Literature Review” chapter for details on France’s state centralization of sovereignty. 
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such as sharing public services and benefits translate to seeing oneself as a “eurocitizen” and 
integrating accordingly?  This question provides a “grassroots” perspective outside the scope of 
this present study.  One can test whether the objectives are having their desired impact, and if 
other agendas are represented within the implicated population.  Policy-wise, such research 
informs whether Eurocity projects are having the effects they are designed to have, which 
institutional actors can then use to adjust policy and activities appropriately.   
Although the objectives of national and supranational actors are important when 
researching Eurocities, they were not the subject of this study.  Current Structural Fund support 
to the CVE reveals that the EU, Spain and Portugal are interested in this type of cross-border 
project; however, their specific objectives remain unexplored.  Future scholarship should 
investigate national and supranational agendas, observing how they compare and contrast with 
subnational.  What does this imply for relative levels of CBC “decision-making competencies” in 
terms of MLG?  Are subnational Eurocity actors simply reflecting the will of their nation-states – 
as Moravcsik’s “liberal intergovernmentalism” predicts – or are sub- and supranational agendas 
winning out over national (Moravcsik 1998: 4)?  Such research also sheds empirical light on the 
predictions of the EoR hypothesis, in regards to power ceding from national to sub- and 
supranational institutional actors.  Addressing these and other previously-mentioned subjects for 
further study will not only have significant implications for understanding Eurocity projects, but 
the future of CBC and integration in Europe.   
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Objectives for Eurocity projects 
Economy Governance Society 
CODE OBJECTIVE CODE OBJECTIVE CODE OBJECTIVE 
1 
Economic 
development 
4 
Achieve common 
goals of 
administration 
8 
Share public 
services 
2 
Improve 
tourism  
5 
Overcome 
administrative 
barriers (EGTC) 
9 
Foster 
“eurocitizens” 
3 
Attract EU 
funding 
6 “Make Europe” 10 
Societal 
rapprochement 
 7 
Increase visibility 
of municipality 
11 
Operationalize a 
de facto situation 
  12 Address daily life 
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Table 7.1: Summary of data 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
1 
better quality of life and social cohesion, territorial and economic competiveness, 
construction of an integrated European territory 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
1 strengthen the interior axis of the North Portugal-Galician Euroregion CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
1 invest in two countries at the same time, and they will be more competitive CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 6 
1 
not only shared services, but also to build new infrastructures and common 
equipments which people care about today  
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 6 
1 create economies of scale and better all residents' quality of life CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
1 increase the population CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
1 
"We want to be an example of substitution of borders in the interest of a broader 
and more competitive territory" 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 8 
1 
"it would be unfortunate to use the Eurocity, as it is not at all a short-term electoral 
campaign project, but a long-term one to attract and maintain population, create an 
attractive social and cultural life, and develop the economy and make it more 
dynamic" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
1 
"the Eurocity is based on the execution of development policies, public 
investments, attracting private projects and improving the quality of life of citizens 
through the joint management of resources" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
1 
"The two cities will gain visibility and capacity to attract public and private 
investments"...the natural spring waters will be "utilized to attract investors" 
through tourism 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6 
1 eliminate political, economic, social and other borders CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 17 
1 
"Already for many years, Galicia and Portugal have been planning social, 
infrastructural and economic (Leader, Interregs...) programs between themselves 
in the interest of consolidating the Northeast Euroregion (Galaecia), which was 
designed and approved by the European Union" 
CVE "Dossier" May 2008: 1 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
1 
Make economy more dynamic, "mobilizing the highest number of factors possible 
within the Eurocity to encourage economic development" 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 103 
1 
address economic and social weaknesses, using the project as a "nucleus" of 
valuables, processes and resources  
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 15 
1 attract investment, create jobs CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 23 
1 attract more residents, visitors and tourists CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 30 
1 
by an increase in scale, appeal for and justify greater investments in order to give 
the area infrastructures and training in music or languages 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 32 
1 
three Axes: create the eurocitizen, a sustainable territory, make the economy more 
dynamic 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 41 
1 
offer a strong response to the dynamic imposed by interterritorial competence 
(e.g., globalization) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 7 
1 future site of a TGV high-speed train station (motivation) EBE Cano 2007b 
1 
create private businesses in both cities that will contribute to economic growth and 
a higher degree of industrialization of their products 
TVE "La creación"  
1 improve rail service between Oporto and Vigo TVE "La creación"  
1 
opportunity for economic, commercial, business, technologic, tourism and 
academic development for the two border locales 
TVE "La creación"  
1 high-speed train station EBE "El PSOE" 
1 EU funds lead to more jobs, better economy, more production EBE Cano 2008a 
1 create a neurologic center of Southwest Iberia EBE Cano 2008d 
1 economic activity EBE Cano 2008d 
1 
Badajoz = Spanish-Portuguese shopping center, logistics platform, AVE Madrid-
Lisboan: Badajoz = the third PT city behind Lisbon and Oporto (motivations) 
EBE Cano 2011 
1 construct a cross-border high-speed train station EBE Cano 2011 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
1 
need to dedicate to new sectors of econ. Activity: alternative and clean energies 
(model of "Ecologic Economy", agroindustry specialization) 
EBE Cano 2011 
1 expand Badajoz airport as a "eurocitizen" airport EBE Cano 2011 
1 create a "Iberian Studies and Statistics Service" EBE Cano 2011 
1 create a museum showcasing contraband EBE Cano 2011 
1 
create ecological agriculture/agro-foods/alternative energy 
industries/jobs/microbusinesses/associations 
EBE Cano 2011 
1 overcome the financial crisis (with new alternative energy focus) EBE Cano 2011 
1 
commercial, investment, tourism, cultural and social relations post-EU accession 
(motivation) 
EBE Cano 2011 
2 
"The two cities will gain visibility and capacity to attract public and private 
investments"...the natural spring waters will be "utilized to attract investors" 
through tourism 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6 
2 attract more residents, visitors and tourists CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 30 
2 
important cultural traditions (oral, literature, musical, plastic arts) that can be 
valorized (motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 32 
2 
opportunity for economic, commercial, business, technologic, tourism and 
academic development for the two border locales 
TVE "La creación"  
2 
"the tourism resources of both cities in the heritage segment, with the medieval 
cathedral as the principal component of Tui, while Valença has its fortified 
enclosure from the modern age" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
2 
commercial, investment, tourism, cultural and social relations post-EU accession 
(motivation) 
EBE Cano 2011 
2 
"The two cities will gain visibility and capacity to attract public and private 
investments"...the natural spring waters will be "utilized to attract investors" 
through tourism 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
3 
"it's only a formula to capture European resources, which should neither 
undervalue nor exaggerate the project" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
3 seek Interreg funding CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 9 
3 EU territorial cooperation programs will likely prioritize EGTC-utilizing projects CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 140 
3 
strategic importance in the EU of "second" generation" CBC (proximity 
cooperation), understood as citizen construction laboratories, which could lead to 
financing possibilities 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 30 
3 
"direct avenues of finance towards the Galicia and North Portugal regions, in 
particular, towards the involved municipalities" 
TVE "La creación"  
3 gain EU funding TVE "La creación"  
3 jointly present projects to access European funds TVE "La creación"  
3 
"'an opportunity' for the social and economic development of these cities, and so 
that Galicia 'continues gaining presence and centrality in the European Union 
(EU),' increasing its chance of attracting funds" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
3 
prepare for the 2012-2020 EU funding period; "only by making agreements will 
we increase" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
3 the "smooth landing" of European funds TVE "Feijóo ve" 
3 EU funds needed EBE "El PSOE" 
3 EU funds lead to more jobs, better economy, more production EBE Cano 2008a 
3 EU funding EBE Cano 2008b 
4 existence of common factors CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
4 
it is important that "the cities that participate in this initiative present common 
projects to the European Union" 
CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 20 
4 achieve things together that would be difficult to achieve separately CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 23 
4 carry out the will of local, provincial, autonomous and national administrations CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 23 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
4 
create and consolidate services that would not be able to exist without this 
initiative 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 45 
4 jointly present projects to access European funds TVE "La creación"  
4 
prepare for the 2012-2020 EU funding period; "only by making agreements will 
we increase" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
4 
POCTEP = opportunity to cooperate lined up with national and regional 
development plans 
EBE Cano 2008e 
4 promotion of the border area, joint management EBE Cano 2008e 
4 construct a cross-border high-speed train station EBE Cano 2011 
4 joint urban plan for a Caia/la Caya border region EBE Cano 2011 
4 create a park EBE Cano 2011 
4 
"Already for many years, Galicia and Portugal have been planning social, 
infrastructural and economic (Leader, Interregs...) programs between themselves 
in the interest of consolidating the Northeast Euroregion (Galaecia), which was 
designed and approved by the European Union" 
CVE "Dossier" May 2008: 1 
4 
EU and national regional development policies, especially those supporting CBC; 
integration of the two cities into the Eixo Atlántico, which has helped facilitate 
cooperation 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 22 
4 past Interreg III-A projects shared between the two cities CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 22 
4 
existence of regional-lvl CBC structures (Eixo, Comunidade de Traballo Galicia-
Norte de Portugal, Comunidade Territorial de Cooperacion do Tamega); past CBC 
between cities 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 31 
4 success of CVE (motivation) EBE Cano 2007a 
4 future Eurocity between Portalegre and Valencia de Alcantara EBE Cano 2008c 
4 learn from CVE's experience in order to become more efficient TVE "La creación"  
4 success of CVE in garnering EU funds (motivation) TVE "La creación"  
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
4 
"Already during recent months Tui and Valença have collaborated on numerous 
joint initiatives.  Whether in the recent participation in the International Tourism 
Fair (Fitur) in Madrid, or previously in Expogalaecia, or various sports 
competitions, cultural activities like the Cabalgata de Reis, environmental 
activities like the planting of the Eurocity forest, etc...these are some activities that 
are already running via this collaboration" 
TVE "O vindeiro" 
4 success of CVE (motivation) EBE Cano 2008d 
4 
CBC relations, including EUROACE organization signal the possible re-
emergence of "Southwest Iberia" 
EBE Cano 2011 
4 
Lobo had seen similar city org.s in Europe and US: France’s Amenagement du 
Territoire, Planes Franceses de Desarrollo, Tennessee Valley Authority, etc.   
EBE Cano 2011 
5 
use the legal framework to overcome existing legal obstacles in order that the two 
locales can share services, which is the essence of the Eurocity project 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
5 
"it is a unique opportunity to externally project the Eurocity and seek strategies to 
break administrative barriers that exist in order to materialize" the project 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 8 
5 
"these types of projects are priorities in Europe because they make possible the 
true overcoming of traditional administrative borders" 
CVE "Dossier" Dec. 2008: 11 
5 eliminate political, economic, social and other borders CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 17 
5 
"'overcome the invisible bureaucratic barriers'" that impede all citizens from both 
cities from accessing health, transportation, education and other services 'in 
equality of rights and obligations'" 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 7 
5 seek legal strategies and instruments to govern the project  CVE "Dossier" Aug. 2008: 1 
5 
Eurocities "are the best way to make Europe and to know what it means to be a 
European citizen, although for this to work legal barriers must be removed to be 
able to implement common projects" 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
5 form a EGTC CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 138 
5 EGTC advantage:  supported by EU law, which has primacy over national laws CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 140 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
5 EU territorial cooperation programs will likely prioritize EGTC-utilizing projects CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 140 
5 inter-institutional ties will lead to future sustainability CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 16 
5 opportunity to create the Eurocity's own legal framework via EGTC CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 30 
5 
use EGTC to promote CBR and Eurocity programs, proposals and projects, which 
promote public-private cooperation 
EBE Cano 2008c 
5 
create a EGTC (which offers the path to more prolific CBC), and a "Eurocity 
Development Agency" to pursue it 
EBE Cano 2011 
6 construction of an integrated European territory CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
6 pioneering initiative in that it moves policymaking closer to the citizen CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
6 pioneering initiative CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
6 regional and European development CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
6 
be an important and effective demonstration that corresponds to the EU's 
philosophy of territorial organization 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
6 
"We want to be an example of substitution of borders in the interest of a broader 
and more competitive territory" 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 8 
6 
"The border between Chaves and Verín was more politically created than is 
commonly accepted and, after 2002, the idea came to tighten connections and 
create something new, which could be an example on the European level" 
CVE "Dossier" Dec. 2008: 2 
6 
"it directly corresponds to the European Union's philosophy of Territorial 
Organization" 
CVE "Dossier" May 2008: 2 
6 
"This is a highly innovative project, allowing the establishment of a cross-border 
cooperation that encompasses numerous socio-cultural, economic and political 
spheres, as well as offering shared public services to citizens" 
CVE "Dossier" May 2008: 2 
6 
"the project directly lines up with the 2007-2012 strategy [for the area], which has 
as one of its pillars the promotion of governance and partnership..." 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 2 
6 "symbolizes the construction of 'New Europe' in a peripheral European corner" CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 7 
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Table 7.1 (cont.) 
 
Code Objective Project Source 
6 
proposition to create a forum that would periodically meet "alongside 
parliamentary support of the Eurocity project, in order to share and present 
initiatives to the various Parliaments concerning the Eurocity...the socialists 
support the Eurocity, which signals a legislative change on the European level" 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 1 
6 
Eurocities "are the best way to make Europe and to know what it means to be a 
European citizen, although for this to work legal barriers must be removed to be 
able to implement common projects" 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
6 project matched up perfectly with Eixo Atlántico's strategic agenda CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 13 
6 
EU and national regional development policies, especially those supporting CBC; 
integration of the two cities into the Eixo Atlántico, which has helped facilitate 
cooperation 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 22 
6 
the location is an access point to the Galicia-North Portugal Euroregion 
(motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 23 
6 play a crucial role in CBRs among Extremadura, Alentejo and Central Portugal EBE Cano 2008c 
6 
help achieve POCTEP 2008-2013 objective of strengthening relationships between 
peripheral regions in Spain and Portugal 
EBE Cano 2008e 
6 
POCTEP = opportunity to cooperate lined up with national and regional 
development plans 
EBE Cano 2008e 
6 
CBC relations, including EUROACE organization, signal the possible re-
emergence of "Southwest Iberia" 
EBE Cano 2011 
6 
"Eurocities, like the Chaves-Verín one, are the best way to make Europe and to 
know what it means to be a European citizen, and as long as we don't realize this, 
Europe won't function. We can move from many smaller populations to one larger 
group and share everything" 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
7 
an excellent laboratory of territorial cooperation practices and social, economic 
and environmental promotion of the North Portugal-Galicia Euroregion 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
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Table 7.1 (cont.)  
 
Code Objective Project Source 
7 "in just one year, this project put Verín and Chaves on the European map" CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
7 
"The two cities will gain visibility and capacity to attract public and private 
investments"...the natural spring waters will be "utilized to attract investors" 
through tourism 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 6 
7 
"it is a unique opportunity to externally project the Eurocity and seek strategies to 
break administrative barriers that exist in order to materialize" the project 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 8 
7 
the current projects "can situate" this Euroregion "on the level that it rightfully 
deserves"; the project is "considered one of the most innovative plans of second 
generation CBC 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2008: 3 
7 
seek legal strategies and instruments to govern the project; join URBACT, an 
organization composed of five other European cross-border cities  
CVE "Dossier" Aug. 2008: 1 
7 
"Eurocities, like the Chaves-Verín one, are the best way to make Europe and to 
know what it means to be a European citizen, and as long as we don't realize this, 
Europe won't function. We can move from many smaller populations to one 
greater group and share everything" 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
7 
axes of city of health: guarantee universal access to public health services, convert 
the Eurocity into a European reference point of health and nature 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 55 
7 
axes of city of creativity: promote artistic and entrepreneurial creativity, creation 
of environments of construction and visibility of the project 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 60, 62 
7 gain centrality in Europe TVE "La creación"  
7 
"'an opportunity' for the social and economic development of these cities, and so 
that Galicia 'continues gaining presence and centrality in the European Union 
(EU),' increasing its chance of attracting funds" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
7 
Badajoz = Hispano-Portuguese shopping center, logistics platform, AVE Madrid-
Lisboa: Badajoz = the third PT city behind Lisbon and Oporto (motivations) 
EBE Cano 2011 
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Code Objective Project Source 
7 
create the "Center of Southwest Iberia": motor of regional economies (Alentejo y 
Extremadura), attracting investments and residents, generating commerce, 
industry, tourism, research, culture and added-values 
EBE Cano 2011 
7 make Elvas and Badajoz the "Iberian capitals" EBE Cano 2011 
7 
CBC relations, including EUROACE organization signal the possible re-
emergence of "Southwest Iberia" 
EBE Cano 2011 
8 
an excellent laboratory of territorial cooperation practices and social, economic 
and environmental promotion of the North Portugal-Galicia Euroregion 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
8 
use the legal framework to overcome existing legal obstacles in order that the two 
locales can share services, which is the essence of the Eurocity project 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
8 
not only shared services, but also to build new infrastructures and common 
equipments which people care about today  
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 6 
8 policy of positive discrimination of territorial equilibrium CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
8 
"the Eurocity is more than capturing funding, although obviously that is a very 
important aspect.  The Eurocity is a laboratory of services for citizens." 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
8 tie together health services more CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 31 
8 
"'overcome the invisible bureaucratic barriers'" that impede all citizens from both 
cities from accessing health, transportation, education and other services 'in 
equality of rights and obligations'" 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 7 
8 make Chaves services available to Verín residents CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 20 
8 share library services CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 43 
8 
Chaves City Library wants to give its contribution to reinforce eurocitizenry, 
adapting itself to this new cooperative reality, by offering Verín residents its 
services 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 1 
8 
cities have common interests and complementarity: resources, logistics, business, 
urban and territorial planning 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 22 
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Code Objective Project Source 
8 create a "free trade zone" (zona franca social) CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 24 
8 
"concretize a free trade zone (zona franca social): the universal and common 
access of citizens to a group of public/collective/social services offered by the two 
cities…this will be the thermometer that evaluates the degree of success or 
weakness of the eurocitizen" 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 46 
8 
axes of free trade zone (zona franca social): promote consolidation of a euro-
identity, incentivize a joint cultural dynamic, potentialize the sharing of resources 
and joint sporting events, education, training and employment (described thereafter 
in the document) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 48 
8 
axes of city of health: guarantee universal access to public health services, convert 
the Eurocity into a European reference point of health and nature 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 55 
8 co-finance public services in order to avoid duplicity (firemen, pools, theaters) TVE "La creación"  
8 
"'the closer' these cities are, 'the more possibilities' they will have to coordinate and 
share services" 
TVE "Feijóo ve" 
8 shared services, promotion of the border area, joint management EBE Cano 2008e 
8 share sanitary and education services EBE Cano 2011 
8 labor and fiscal harmonization, preferential treatment of one another EBE Cano 2011 
8 share services TVE Gonzáles 2012 
9 "this project contributed more to eurocitizenry than any institutional treaty" CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 10 
9 
"a laboratory of practices whose experience can be extrapolated to other border 
regions, encouraging Second Generation Cooperation" 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 4 
9 
Eurocities "are the best way to make Europe and to know what it means to be a 
European citizen, although for this to work legal barriers must be removed to be 
able to implement common projects" 
CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
9 model of best practices in second generation cooperation CVE "Dossier" Feb. 2009: 5 
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Code Objective Project Source 
9 
enter into the second generation of EU CBC, beyond infrastructures to the daily 
lives of "artificially-separated citizens" -- a "true citizen construction laboratory" 
of shared living among equals 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 13 
9 create a "European laboratory of new citizens" CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 24 
9 
strategic importance in the EU of "second" generation" CBC (proximity 
cooperation), understood as citizen construction laboratories, which could lead to 
financing possibilities 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 30 
9 
three Axes: create the eurocitizen, a sustainable territory, make the economy more 
dynamic 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 41 
9 
"construct a new system of symbolic loyalties for citizens, a complementary and 
beneficial identity: a eurocitizen" 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 45 
9 create Eurocitizen card TVE "La creación"  
9 expand Badajoz airport as a "eurocitizen" airport EBE Cano 2011 
9 
define the territory (marca territorial) of the Eurocity in order to foster 
eurocitizenry 
EBE Cano 2011 
9 create "Eurocitizen cards" (carné de eurociudadanos) TVE Gonzáles 2012 
9 
axes of free trade zone (zona franca social): promote consolidation of a euro-
identity, incentivize a joint cultural dynamic, potentialize the sharing of resources 
and joint sporting events, education, training and employment (described thereafter 
in the document) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 48 
10 bilingual training from infancy EBE Cano 2011 
10 
promote a new generation of bilingual eurocitizens: overlap citizens in terms of 
language and culture 
EBE Cano 2011 
10 
Iberismo/Lusofonia/Iberofonia/Hispanidad rhetoric: encourage bilingualism and a 
hybrid language/culture  
EBE Cano 2011 
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Code Objective Project Source 
10 
"operationalize a historical-social connection that has existed for many years 
between the two peoples" with actions "that translate into social benefits for the 
two populations...it is necessary for this reason to incentivize social and cultural 
integration, invest in the promotion of a common cultural heritage, and create a 
feeling of belonging" 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 46 
10 
better quality of life and social cohesion, territorial and economic competiveness, 
construction of an integrated European territory 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
10 eliminate political, economic, social and other borders CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 17 
10 
encourage cultural exchange; training will be "equal in Galicia and North 
Portugal" for associations that work with youth 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 17 
10 
this "laboratory...makes it possible for "Chaves and Verín to be merely the 
Southern and Northern neighborhoods of a single territory" 
CVE "Dossier" July 2008: 27 
10 
promote Portuguese language courses in the interest of encouraging both 
populations to come together 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 23 
10 learn both languages, Spanish and Portuguese is one objective CVE "Dossier" June 2008: 5 
10 strengthen relations with Chaves CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 7 
10 creation of online bilingual media mediums EBE Cano 2011 
10 
Iberismo/Lusofonia/Iberofonia/Hispanidad rhetoric: encourage bilingualism and a 
hybrid language/culture  
EBE Cano 2011 
10 get Eurocity residents to unite over this initiative CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 8 
10 
two neighborhoods of the same city: must improve mobility and public 
transportation 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 95 
10 Portugal and Spain's fraternal wisdom and development  EBE Cano 2008c 
10 
"promote a strong working relationship between the respective scientific 
communities" 
TVE "La creación"  
10 need for mutual understanding on crucial issues EBE "El PSOE" 
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Code Objective Project Source 
10 
create a university institute focused on learning the languages of the Iberian 
Peninsula 
EBE Cano 2011 
10 
create a better internal understanding b/w PT and ES, so they can project a better 
outward image 
EBE Cano 2011 
10 create a "Center of Cross-border and Iberian Studies" EBE Cano 2011 
10 pursue joint university research inside a "European Space of Higher Education" EBE Cano 2011 
10 
cooperation among scientific and technological communities to develop a strong 
working relationship 
TVE Gonzáles 2012 
11 take advantage of the existing potential CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
11 
"This wasn't created out of nothing, it is not an abstract political decision, it comes 
from the profound common roots existing between the two communities...it is the 
recognition of a reality that already exists, but that can be deepened" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 7 
11 
"We are working with a reality that is sociologically perceived more clearly by 
locals than in the political, administrative or legal spheres that are in charge with 
developing the project." 
CVE "Dossier" Dec. 2008: 11 
11 
"The border between Chaves and Verín was more politically created than is 
commonly accepted and, after 2002, the idea came to tighten connections and 
create something new, which could be an example on the European level" 
CVE "Dossier" Dec. 2008: 2 
11 
For many years, Galicia and Portugal lived divided by "a false frontier.  I am sure 
that there are many locals of the Monterrei and Chaves regions that find more in 
common among themselves than with citizens from other parts of Spain." Thus, 
"what was always a natural condition for locals should be converted into a political 
one" 
CVE "Dossier" Apr. 2008: 20 
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Code Objective Project Source 
11 
"the citizens 'demand more advanced solutions than those that traditionally exist in 
the context of nation-based societies'...the "worth' of the Eurocity is that 'it is 
propelled by local entities', as it counts on 'a component of proximity and 
immediate service'" 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 7 
11 de facto situation CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 15 
11 
geographic convenience: two cities are close to one another and connected by a 
highway 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 21 
11 
geographic, historical, cultural and political-institutional closeness that has 
tightened through CBC initiatives; consolidation of a common living space 
(residence, free time, work) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 22 
11 
geographic, linguistic, historical, cultural and politico-institutional proximity 
(motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 31 
11 
important cultural traditions (oral, literature, musical, plastic arts) that can be 
valorized (motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 32 
11 common geologic features (motivation) CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 33 
11 
the course of the Tamega River that "flows perpendicular to the border and that is 
a unifying element ("umbilical cord") between the two cities and forms a corridor 
(Val do Tamega) of enormous natural and environmental richness (motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 33 
11 
a rich shared cultural and historical heritage shared and disputed over time: the 
people traded and lived together through the good and the bad, suffered the recent 
depression together (motivation) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 45 
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Code Objective Project Source 
11 
"operationalize a historical-social connection that has existed for many years 
between the two peoples" with actions "that translate into social benefits for the 
two populations...it is necessary for this reason to incentivize social and cultural 
integration, invest in the promotion of a common cultural heritage, and create a 
feeling of belonging" 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 46 
11 
axes of free trade zone (zona franca social): promote consolidation of a euro-
identity, incentivize a joint cultural dynamic, potentialize the sharing of resources 
and joint sporting events, education, training and employment (described thereafter 
in the document) 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 48 
11 
axes of city of creativity: promote artistic and entrepreneurial creativity, creation 
of environments of construction and visibility of the project 
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 60, 62 
11 
Badajoz = Hispano-Luso shopping center, logistics platform, AVE Madrid-Lisboa: 
Badajoz = the third PT city behind Lisbon and Oporto (motivations) 
EBE Cano 2011 
11 
geographically between Madrid and Lisbon, at a historic point of encounter 
(motivation) 
EBE Cano 2011 
11 only 8 km apart (motivation) EBE Cano 2011 
11 
go from de facto to de juri: already have cross-border shopping, living, use of 
public services (sanitary), hospital visits, food industry, music consumption, 
cultural events, sporting events, national celebrations/holidays 
EBE Cano 2011 
11 
commercial, investment, tourism, cultural and social relations post-EU accession 
(motivation) 
EBE Cano 2011 
11 historical relationships EBE Cano 2011 
12 
better quality of life and social cohesion, territorial and economic competiveness, 
construction of an integrated European territory 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 1 
12 create economies of scale and better all residents' quality of life CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2008: 7 
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Code Objective Project Source 
12 
"it would be unfortunate to use the Eurocity, as it is not at all a short-term electoral 
campaign project, but a long-term one to attract and maintain population, create an 
attractive social and cultural life, and develop the economy and make it more 
dynamic" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
12 
"the Eurocity is based on the execution of development policies, public 
investments, attracting private projects and improving the quality of life of citizens 
through the joint management of resources" 
CVE "Dossier" Oct. 2008: 4 
12 
"'the 15 years of work' completed by the Eixo Atlántico -- who propelled the 
project -- are beginning 'to bear fruit', being that this work encourages the creation 
of "spaces of meeting, neither institutional nor political, but spaces in which the 
daily problems that affect citizens on both sides of an arbitrary line are common" 
CVE "Dossier" Jan. 2009: 7 
12 address daily lives of locals CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 14 
12 
address economic and social weaknesses, using the project as a "nucleus" of 
valuables, processes and resources  
CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 15 
12 improve quality of life of the citizens CVE Mao, ed. 2008: 23 
 
 
